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RESTORING WHAT'S ENVIRONMENTAL ABOUT
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT
Richard J. Lazarus
In this Article, Professor Richard Lazarus examines the votes of the individ-
ual Justices who have decided environmental law cases before the United States
Supreme Court during the past three decades. The Article reports on a number
of interesting statistics regarding the identity of those Justices who have most
influenced the Court's environmental law jurisprudence and the sometimes curi-
ous patterns in voting exhibited by individual Justices. Lazarus's thesis is that the
Supreme Court's apparent apathy or even antipathy towards environmental law
during that time results from the Justices' failure to appreciate environmental law
as a distinct area of law. The Justices have instead tended to view environmental
protection as merely an incidental factual context for the presentation of legal
issues that share no unique environmental dimension.
Lazarus posits that this view of environmental law is misguided and that it
has resulted in poorer Court decisions. Missing from the Court's analysis has
been sufficient emphasis on the nature and normative weightiness of environ-
mental protection concerns and their import both for judicial construction of rele-
vant legal rules and for the Court's understanding of the workings of relevant
lawmaking institutions. Finally, Lazarus describes how the environmental dimen-
sion to environmental law might be restored to the nation's highest Court. This
discussion includes a description of how the ecological character of the problem
addressed by environmental law affects legal doctrine and lawmaking institutions
and how current and future Justices might be made better aware of that relationship.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's treatment of environmental law
presents a puzzle. Few would likely dispute the historical thesis that the
judiciary's active promotion of environmental protection in the 19 60s and
early 1970s played a major role in the emergence of that remarkable series
of far-reaching statutory enactments that constitute modem environmental
law. Nor would there be much dispute regarding the assertion that those
statutory enactments, whatever one's views of their efficacy, represent one of
the most ambitious legislative and executive branch undertakings of the
past half-century.
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The puzzle nonetheless presented concerns the sharply contrasting role
played by the Supreme Court during this remarkable period of legal evolu-
tion. In other comparable legal transformations, such as those that occurred
during the twentieth century in antitrust, civil rights, labor, and securities
law, the Court has been actively engaged in the law's development. The
Court's docket reflects its willingness and interest in addressing the host of
legal issues invariably raised by the introduction of a wholly new field of
law. And, at least since the New Deal, the Court has generally been more
responsive than openly hostile to the new values and priorities reflected in
these statutory enactments in other areas of law, notwithstanding that their
translation and application to specific contexts may engender much disagree-
ment and controversy between the Justices.
The Court's response to environmental law during the past three dec-
ades, however, has been decidedly different. One commentator, based on his
review of the Court's environmental rulings, recently concluded that "the
Court has either stayed on the sidelines or participated ineffectually in the
making of environmental law."' Two other commentators, upon reviewing
sixty-seven Court rulings from 1960 to 1988, found that the Court, rather
than exhibiting any receptivity to environmental law's basic precepts, had
been openly and actively hostile in its rulings.2
The purpose of this Article is to explore the Supreme Court's apparent
apathy or antipathy towards environmental law. The data set of cases con-
sidered is much larger-by a factor of almost four-than those of prior aca-
demic inquiries. This is partly because those inquiries were each performed
several years ago and the Court has since decided many more cases. But it
is also much larger because it includes as environmental cases the Court's
natural resource cases and not simply the classic pollution control cases.
What most distinguishes this inquiry from those conducted in the past
is that this Article deliberately declines to entertain the traditional analytic
fiction that the Court is a monolithic institution, the actions of which com-
mentators must therefore strive to explain presuming the existence of a single
unified, coherent lawmaking entity. The Article seeks instead to understand
the role of the Supreme Court in environmental law by piercing that ficti-
tious judicial veil surrounding the Court's decision making to consider the
votes and possible motivations of the nineteen individual Justices who have
1. Daniel A. Farber, Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant?: Reflections on the Judicial Role in Envi-
ronmental Law, 81 MINN. L. REv. 547, 569 (1997).
2. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme
Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 343, 421 (1989) (stating that the Court
"demonstrates... a consistent pro-development pattern ... since 1976," and that "these decisions
reflect policy activism by the Court").
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served on the Court since October Term 1969 and who have formed the
shifting majority coalitions underlying its environmental rulings.
Environmental protection is far more challenging for law than it might
seem. The very nature of the ecological injuries being avoided in the first
instance or redressed after the fact poses substantial problems for lawmaking
institutions attempting to construct a legal regime for environmental pro-
tection. These include serious tensions created between environmental pro-
tection goals and legal doctrine in areas of law governing behavior that may
cause ecological injury. Lawmaking institutions must strive to resolve these
tensions, many of which resist easy answers. Because, moreover, the distribu-
tional stakes of alternative resolutions are so great, any institutional efforts
to fashion environmental protection rules are invariably plagued by compe-
tition both between sovereign authorities and between branches of govern-
ment within any one sovereign, which raises another array of legal issues.
The Article's thesis is that, unlike some lower court judges, the Justices
have never fully appreciated environmental law as a distinct area of law.
They perceive environmental law instead as merely an incidental factual
context, in which environmental protection concerns are at stake, but there
is nothing uniquely environmental about the legal issues being raised. The
Justices, accordingly, fail to appreciate how the nature of the environmental
concerns being addressed can sometimes be relevant to their resolution of
those legal issues.
Nor have the Justices (with one distinct exception) embraced either
environmental law's ends or the importance of the values it emphasizes.
These values should be entitled to substantial weight in the balancing of
competing considerations that the Justices invariably undertake in deciding
how to vote on a host of legal issues presented to the Court. The Justices'
attitudes towards environmental law, moreover, have become increasingly
skeptical over time. This result has occurred notwithstanding the tenacity
with which the public, in general, and the legislative and executive branches,
in particular, have during this same time period maintained and expanded
the nation's commitment to environmental protection through an increas-
ingly comprehensive and demanding set of legal rules.'
There are, moreover, significant costs and risks associated with the Jus-
tices' apparent indifference and occasional hostility towards environmental
3. To be sure, it would seem odd to characterize either the executive branch during the
first term of the Reagan Administration or the House of Representatives during the 104th Con-
gress, or even since, as favoring that federal environmental protection laws be "maintained and
expanded," but the characterization would be accurate nonetheless. Notwithstanding substantial
misgivings, they responded to public opinion by abandoning plans to limit or repeal existing laws
and ultimately ended up enacting even stronger environmental protection laws in their place. See
Richard J. Lazarus, Fairness in Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 705, 707-10 (1997).
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law. Environmental protection goals are frustrated, resulting in substantial
losses in environmental quality and public health and welfare. Also lost are
important lessons that environmental law teaches about existing legal doc-
trine and lawmaking processes and institutions that are necessary for their
proper evolution.
As a result, the Court sometimes fails to modify a particular area of law
in its application to an environmental context. Other times, the cost is the
Court's failure to appreciate that an entire area of law warrants rethinking
because of the broader repercussions of the problems in existing law that
environmental issues serve to highlight. In the former circumstance, the
change in legal rule is relatively confined (to the environmental setting),
but in the latter the legal change applies more broadly.
Exploring this thesis, the Article is divided into three parts. The first
undertakes a detailed analysis of votes of the Justices in each of the Supreme
Court's environmental cases during the past three decades (1969-1999)
that can be fairly said to establish the current temporal boundaries of the
modem era of environmental law. The analysis and related findings are both
qualitative and quantitative, although the latter's effort to "score" numeri-
cally each of the Justices on their promotion of environmental protection is
riddled with caveats to guard against its potential foolish misuse.
The second part of the Article strives both to explain these findings
and to comment upon their significance. The former undertaking includes
discussion of what the findings suggest about the nature of environmental
law. Included in this explanation is how environmental law relates to other
areas of law with which it inevitably and repeatedly intersects. The latter
commentary extends to what may be the most important conclusion emerg-
ing from the overall analysis of the Court's environmental case law, which
is that the Justices themselves are misapprehending the relationship of envi-
ronmental law to these other intersecting areas of law. What is increasingly
absent from the Court's analysis is an adequate appreciation of the distinctively
environmental dimension of environmental law. Too few, if any, members of
the Court seem to grasp how that environmental dimension is relevant to the
law's evolution and, therefore, should be relevant to the Court's own rulings.
The third and final part of the Article considers how to restore what is
environmental about environmental law. This requires, in the first instance,
discussion of what is environmental about environmental law. This necessarily
includes identifying both the central features of environmental law that
make it somehow distinctive and the significance of those features for both
legal doctrine and lawmaking institutions and processes. Finally, the Article
discusses how the Justices, including future Justices, might be better persuaded
of this broader view of environmental law and the importance of its ends.
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I. THREE DECADES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE SUPREME
COURT: A SCORECARD OF WHO WROTE, WHOSE VIEWS PREVAILED,
AND HOW, IF AT ALL, DID THE ENVIRONMENT INFLUENCE THE VOTES
OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES
Commencing with the Supreme Court's October Term 1969, the Court
has decided over 240 environmental law cases.4 The sample is sufficiently
large to support a host of intriguing statistical inquiries. This Article, how-
ever, focuses on only three: (1) which Justices wrote the most decisions for
the Court during the past thirty years; (2) which Justices have been in the
majority the most frequently; and (3) which Justices have tended to vote for
outcomes that are more rather than less protective of the environment, and
which Justices have tended to do the converse (that is, less rather than more).
A. The Justices Who Wrote the Most Environmental Decisions
for the Court
Speculation regarding the identity of the Justice who has written the
most environmental opinions for the Court during the past thirty years would
likely begin with Chief Justice Rehnquist. The Chief Justice has served on
the Court the longest of anyone presently there and his tenure virtually
spans the relevant time period. He joined the Court as a Justice in 1971, just
as the modem era of environmental law was commencing. He has, accord-
ingly, participated in 213 of the 243 environmental cases decided by the
Court during the past three decades, which is significantly more than any
other Justice.5
But in fact, neither is it the Chief Justice leading the pack nor is it even
a close question as to who has written the most environmental opinions for
4. A full listing of the cases is included infra in Appendix A to this Article. Whether a
case is considered "environmental" for the broader purposes of this threshold inquiry turns on
whether environmental protection or natural resources matters are at stake. The legal issue before
the Court need not independently have an environmental character to it. The stakes themselves
are sufficient to invoke the label. One reason why the data set for this Article is so large is that I
have included all the "original action" cases decided by the Court that involve disputes over natural
resources (a few also involve pollution control). These cases range from quite significant disputes
between states over water allocation, see, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983); Arizona
v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982), to more rarified
boundary disputes between states and between states and the United States, see, e.g., Louisiana
v. Mississippi, 466 U.S. 96 (1984). Even when such seemingly mundane boundary disputes are at
issue, however, they may mask natural resource disputes of enormous environmental significance.
See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1 (1997).
5. His closest competitors are Justices Blackmun, White, and Stevens, who heard 201,
196, and 186 cases respectively. See infra Appendix B.
708 47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 703 (2000)
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the Court. Nineteen Justices have served on the Court during the relevant
time period,' and Justice White, who left the Court in 1993, is the leading
opinion writer for the Court by a large margin.
Justice White has written thirty-six environmental opinions. The next
closest is Justice O'Connor, with twenty-two opinions for the Court. What
is revealing about Justice White's identity as the most prolific opinion writer
for the Court in environmental cases is that, as far as can be discerned,
White harbored no particular interest in environmental law. His opinions
are dispassionate, dry, and formalistic, with little effort to elaborate any par-
ticular philosophical vision.
In this respect, moreover, Justice White's environmental law opinions
do not differ from his opinions for the Court generally. Perhaps not unlike
the Justice himself, a recent biography is matter of fact and dispassionate in
its assessment of White's opinion writing as evidencing little "elaboration of
a philosophical vision"' and "never aspir[ing] beyond plain, workmanlike
prose... "He wrote to get the job done, no more.' 9 "Being non-ideological
and non-doctrinaire [was] clearly very important to White,"1 and he dis-
played "disdain for ideological enthusiasms.""
Justice White's opinions, consistent with his pattern, certainly do not
exhibit any environmental ethic. Nor do they express an anti-environmental
ethic. In fact, White's opinions fail to suggest that the environmental dimen-
sion of the cases played any independent role in the Court's decision or
reasoning. 2
Justice White's controlling philosophy (or lack thereof) is exemplified
by his votes in three cases during the 1986 October Term. The Supreme
Court that term handed down the so-called Takings Trilogy, three cases
raising Fifth Amendment regulatory takings challenges to environmental
6. The Justices are Harlan, Black, Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun,
Powell, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, and there
have been two Chief Justices, Burger and Rehnquist.
7. DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE 451 (1998)
(quoting Kate Stith, Byron R. White, Last of the New Deal Liberals, 103 YALE L.J. 19, 19 (1993)).
8. Id. at 454.
9. Id. at 454 (quoting Frank Allen, former co-clerk to Justice White).
10. Id. at 457 (quoting David Frederick, former clerk to Justice White).
11. Id. at 446 (quoting Vincent Blasi, Columbia Law School professor).
12. Justice White's general neutrality on the environmental protection dimension of cases
is also consistent with his general voting pattern in those cases, at least as reflected in a score of
36.3 out of a possible 100, with the latter representing a "perfect" score favoring environmental
protection in all votes cast. See infra text accompanying note 114. To that same effect it is note-
worthy that Hutchinson's recent biography of the Justice includes virtually no mention of any
environmental cases in discussing White's opinions for the Court, even though White was the
Court's leading opinion writer in environmental law cases. See generally HUTCHINSON, supra note 7.
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restrictions. 3 In its first ruling, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBene-
dictis,4 the Court by a slim five-to-four vote rejected a takings challenge
brought against a Pennsylvania law that sharply limited surface coal mining
because of the associated risks to the environment and public safety.'" What
made the ruling especially remarkable was the Court's narrow reading of its
seminal regulatory takings precedent, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 6 writ-
ten by Justice Holmes 7 and from which Justice Brandeis famously dissented. 8
In its second relevant decision that same term, the Court in First Eng-
lish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles 9 rejected the argu-
ments of the United States and of state and local governments nationwide
by ruling that the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause mandated
a remedy in money damages (presumably measured by just compensation)
for regulatory takings, including temporary takings.2" But it was the Court's
third decision, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission2' that, juxtaposed
with Keystone Bituminous Coal, presented a true jurisprudential paradox. It
was not simply because the Court held unconstitutional a state restriction
on development that conditioned the development on the landowner's
providing the public with access to his privately owned beach immediately
in front of his home. It was because, in Nollan, the Court both resurrected
and substantially reinvigorated the very Pennsylvania Coal regulatory takings
opinion by Holmes that the Court had a few weeks earlier seemed, remarka-
bly, to bury.
Only one Justice was in the majority in all three cases: Justice White.
White, however, offered no hint as to how he reconciled the three votes.
He did not author any of the three opinions. Nor did he choose to elaborate
on his views in any separately filed concurring opinions. He simply voted.
In the absence of any discernible explanation, express or implied, it seems
fair to state that Justice White was not basing his vote in these three cases
on any overarching theory of the relationship of private property to envi-
ronmental protection in the Fifth Amendment regulatory takings context.
Even more broadly, based on his opinions for the Court, it is equally
fair to say that the leading opinion writer for the Court in environmental
13. See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1600-01 (1988).
14. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
15. See id. at 474.
16. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
17. See id. at 412.
18. See id. at 416 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
19. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
20. See id. at 321.
21. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
22. See id. at 831-37.
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cases during the past three decades was not someone possessing any distinct
vision of the role of law in environmental protection. His opinions for the
Court do not reflect any deliberation regarding the special demands that
environmental protection may place on law and lawmaking institutions.
White expressed no thoughts concerning the possible impact of scientific
uncertainty or irreversible impacts on standards of judicial review. Nor,
similarly, do his opinions display any discernible effort to discern and con-
sider how the interests of future generations in environmental protection
may warrant consideration in the law's evolution.
The official papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, which are publicly
available through the Library of Congress, provide a surprisingly illuminat-
ing example of Justice White's thinking and its impact on both his vote and
the Court's rulings. In Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,23 the issue before the Court was the validity of the
EPA's construction of section 301 of the Clean Water Act to allow for the
agency to grant so-called fundamentally different factor variances for dis-
charges of toxic pollutants. 4 Justice White wrote an opinion for the Court's
slim five-Justice majority that upheld the EPA's construction of the Clean
Water Act, thereby rejecting the Natural Resource Defense Council's
(NRDC's) contention that the statutory language precluded allowing such a
variance for toxic discharges.
The Marshall papers disclose that at the Court's conference Justice
White, in his own words, initially "waffl[ed]" on whether he would write in
favor or in opposition to the EPA's toxic variance policy. Somewhat para-
doxically, the Chief Justice assigned the opinion of the Court to him
regardless of his ultimate vote, apparently because whichever way White
voted would be the fifth vote and therefore constitute the majority view.
Justice White ultimately decided to vote in favor of the EPA and to write
the opinion to that effect.25
In internal correspondence to Justice Marshall, who wrote the dissent
for himself and three other Justices, White revealed his rationale.26 He
stated that he saw "little or no difference in principle between us, and admin-
istrative law will not be measurably advanced or set back however this case
23. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
24. See id. at 118 n.2 (citing EPA requirements under the Clean Water Act § 307, 33
U.S.C. § 1317). Congress has since amended section 301 to include a fundamentally different
factor variance expressly applicable to toxic pollutant discharges. See Clean Water Act § 301, 33
U.S.C. § 1311(n) (1994).
25. See Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 1 (Nov. 13,
1984) (on file with the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
26. See Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Justice Thurgood Marshall 1 (Feb. 13, 1985)
(on file with the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
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is decided."27 In effect, because no overarching principles of administrative
law were at stake, White did not see the case, whichever way it was decided,
as being of significant import. The case presented only a narrow, fact-bound
issue whether there was sufficient basis in the administrative record to sup-
port this one administrative rule. The environmental protection aspects of
the case played no apparent role of independent significance.
In contrast, Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion emphasized the rele-
vancy of the environmental protection context to the issues of statutory
construction before the Court. The dissent discussed how factors such as
scientific uncertainty, possible "irreversible or catastrophic results,"2 and
the presence of "thresholds" in environmental problems should influence
the Court's legal analysis.29 The dissent also explained how "when Congress
has attached great importance to certain environmental goals, [the Court]
ha[s] disallowed exceptions even in the absence of an explicit statutory
ban."3 Marshall's dissent, in short, responded to the environmental context
within which the administrative law issue arose and discerned how that con-
text should affect the issue's resolution. White's opinion for the Court in
Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n, like his environmental and natural resource
opinions in general, evinced no such contextual awareness and drew no such
readily available connections.
B. The Justices Who Were Most Often in the Majority
in Environmental Cases
Another revealing factual inquiry concerns the frequency with which
individual Justices were in the majority in environmental cases during the
past thirty years.3' In evaluating the frequency, however, one must place
the results in context, because the Justices actually are unanimous in their
views far more often than is realized in all cases, not just in environmental
cases. During the Court's four most recent October Terms (1995-98), for
instance, the Court reached a unanimous result in 38.7, 37.2, 43, and
29.6 percent of all cases.32 The overall percentages for unanimous opinions
27. Id.
28. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 470 U.S. at 159 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
29. See id. at 159 n.19.
30. Id. at 160.
31. The results of this analysis are compiled infra in Appendix B.
32. See The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-The Statistics, 113 HARV. L. REV. 400, 404
(1999); The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122, 370 (1998); The
Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 197, 433 (1997); The Supreme
Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 369 (1996). Historically, however,
the proportion of Supreme Court opinions with a dissenting opinion has been much higher since
about 1940. Between 1800 and 1940, with rare exceptions, no more than 20 percent of the opin-
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are similarly high for environmental and natural resources cases during the
past three decades, although lower than these generally applicable percent-
ages for the four most recent terms. Out of the 243 environmental cases
decided on the merits since October Term 1969, the Court decided eighty-six
without any dissent, or 35.4 percent of the cases. Fifty-seven (23.5 percent)
of these cases were decided by a unanimous vote.
Consequently, the percentage differences between the Justices in their
joining the majority in environmental cases are relatively small. The low-
est percentage out of the nineteen Justices whose votes were surveyed is
64.5 percent and belongs to Justice Douglas.33 The highest score belongs to
Justice Kennedy, who voted with the majority over 96 percent of the time. 4
Not surprisingly, Justice White's percentage for being in the majority is
very high; he voted with the majority 86.9 percent of the time. There is, of
course, at least one neutral explanation for why he wrote so many opinions
for the Court. He had more opportunities because of his lengthy tenure on
the Court. But opportunities and opinions do not necessarily go hand-in-
hand. Chief Justice Burger, for instance, had an even higher percentage for
being in the majority and wrote far fewer opinions. The Chief Justice was
in the majority in over 90 percent of the relevant cases. Yet, he wrote only
eight opinions for the Court.
The explanation for this phenomenon is likely different from that for
White. Burger had a reputation for changing or otherwise manipulating his
vote in order to retain the power to assign the opinion." The Chief Justice's
prerogative was to vote first, but Burger frequently either voted last or changed
his initial "tentative" vote after the others had voted in order to be in the
36majority. Some view his doing so as deriving from a desire to be ideologi-
cally manipulative. If in the majority, the Chief Justice would, as the most
senior Justice, have the power of assigning the opinion and could therefore
ions generally included a dissent, and the percentage was often lower than 10 percent. See LEE
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 24 fig.2-1 (1998).
33. Justice Douglas's percentages, however, provide an especially tenuous basis for drawing
conclusions, because the sample of cases was so small. Notwithstanding Justice Douglas's notori-
ety on environmental matters, he voted in only 18 environmental cases before the Court. If,
moreover, one included in his vote tallies two cases in which he did not side clearly with either
the dissent or the majority and counted those as dissents, Justice Douglas's percentage for being in
the majority would fall even lower.
34. The broader significance of Justice Kennedy's role in environmental cases before the
Court is discussed infra text accompanying notes 42-48.
35. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 32, at 125-35; EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED
CHAMBERS 350 (1998) ("The other Justices had fumed over past instances where the Chief had
usurped the assignment power .. "); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN
64-69 (1979).
36. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 35, at 66-67.
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simply assign the case either to himself or to someone likely to draft an
opinion in a way he found most sympathetic. 7
When Chief Justice Burger authored the opinion in one of the most
celebrated environmental cases during the past thirty years, the snail darter
case, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,3 there was contemporaneous specu-
lation that he had done just that: changed his vote so that he could assign
the opinion to himself and then write an opinion that questioned rather
than embraced the very result the Court reached, in order to promote con-
gressional revisions of the Endangered Species Act.39 The Chief Justice's
opinion for the Court certainly includes some rhetoric seemingly skeptical
of the policy implications of its own ruling.' Perhaps further buttressing
the veracity of that initial speculation, the official papers of Justice Marshall
have since revealed that the Chief Justice initially voted with the dissenters.4
The most telling fact about the tendency of Justices to vote in the
majority in environmental cases, however, does not relate to either Chief
Justice Burger or Justice White. The Justice with the most astounding rec-
ord for being in the majority is Justice Kennedy. Kennedy has participated
in fifty-seven environmental cases to date. Yet, other than in an original
action concerning an interstate water compact,42 the Justice has dissented
37. See id. at 64-65. Another possibility is that Chief Justice Burger was adhering to a tra-
ditional parliamentary format in which the chair of a proceeding votes last. This possibility was
suggested to me by a former clerk to the Chief Justice, who disputed the thesis that Burger was
deliberately manipulative. Adhering to the traditional practice of many clerks not to speak on the
record about their clerkship experiences, he preferred to speak without attribution.
38. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
39. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
40. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority, 437 U.S. at 159 ("Until recently the finding of a
new species of animal life would hardly generate a cause clbre."); id. at 172 ("It may seem curious
to some that the survival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish among all the countless
millions of species extant would require the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for
which Congress has expended more than $100 million."); id. at 194 ("Our individual appraisal of
the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put
aside in the process of interpreting a statute.").
41. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the
Marshall Papers, [1993 News] 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10606,10610-11 (Oct. 1993). My
own view is that the power of opinion assignment likely prompted Chief Justice Burger to vote
last or to change his vote to be in the majority, but not necessarily based on some ideological
motivation. It may well have been simply an effort to maximize his bureaucratic authority within
the Court. The more often he was in the majority, the more often he could disburse the wealth
of the Court: the assigning of opinions in the more interesting cases. See WOODWARD &
ARMSTRONG, supra note 35, at 64-65. Or more neutrally stated, the more often the Chief Justice
possessed the assignment power, the more able he would be to ensure rough equity amongst the
Justices in his opinion assignments. Such rough equity is significantly harder to accomplish if
the identity of the Justice assigning the opinion frequently changes.
42. See Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 242 (1991) (Kennedy, J., joining in a
concurring and dissenting opinion by Rehnquist, C.J.).
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only once: Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.43 The Court, moreover, has since
overruled its Eleventh Amendment decision in Union Gas.' So, in effect,
Justice Kennedy's record is almost 100 percent (putting aside a few somewhat
qualified concurring or partially concurring opinions)."
But how many opinions for the Court has Justice Kennedy written?
Based solely on the ratios for other Justices comparing number of cases in the
majority to Court opinions, one might expect as many as ten but certainly
no fewer than six. But, in fact, until the Court's most recent term, Kennedy
had written only two opinions for the Court.' This past term, he added two
more.47 Kennedy supplied, moreover, the deciding fifth vote in three out of
those four cases.
This is a striking result. The most significant vote has had little to no
direct expression in the Court's opinion writing. Justice Kennedy is the key
to the majority in environmental protection and natural resources law cases
today. Yet he almost never writes an opinion for the Court on these issues.
The upshot is the exacerbation of the Court's longstanding lack of
environmental voice. Justice White, who wrote most of the opinions, did
not provide it. Justice Kennedy, who now appears to reflect the controlling
philosophy for the Court in these cases, has similarly not yet expressed an
overarching view of the environmental law field. He has instead mostly
just joined opinions that, because they are the product of shifting majority
coalitions, lack any coherent or consistent theme.48
C. Scoring the Justices on Environmental Protection
The last categorical inquiry concerns the voting patterns of individual
Justices based on the relationship of their votes to environmental protection
and natural resource conservation objectives. For this purpose, the Article
undertakes two different kinds of inquiries. The first is more qualitative and
impressionistic. The second is more quantitative. The former reviews the
votes of the Justices in each of the environmental cases decided during the
43. 491 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (Kennedy, J., joining in a dissenting opinion by Scalia, J.).
44. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63-73 (1996).
45. During the October 1991 Term, Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring), which joined Justice Scalia's
majority opinion with some qualifications, and a concurring opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (1992) (Kennedy, J. concurring), which joined only in the judgment.
46. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 263 (1997); C&A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 385 (1994).
47. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 S. Ct. 1719, 1721 (1999);
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1999).
48. A few isolated opinions of Justice Kennedy, however, suggest the possibility of his devel-
oping his own distinct vision of environmental law. See infra text accompanying notes 177-181.
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past three decades to discern whether their votes exhibited a clear and dis-
cernible pattern of either promoting or not promoting environmental
protection. The second inquiry examines each case and labels one possible
outcome as the environmentally favored outcome and the other as the
environmentally disfavored result, for the ultimate purpose of assigning
each Justice a "score" based on the extent to which their votes favored more
rather than less environmental protection.
Three mutually compatible hypotheses emerge from these qualitative
and quantitative reviews of the votes of the individual Justices in environ-
mental cases. The first is that most of the votes of most of the Justices suggest
that the environmental protection dimension of the case was not an influential
factor one way or the other. The second hypothesis is that, notwithstanding
this initial finding, the votes of a very few Justices over the past three decades
do reveal enough of a disproportionate tendency to vote one way rather
than another in environmental cases to suggest that the environmental
context was, for them, a substantial factor influencing their votes. For some,
this led them to vote for the more environmentally protective outcome. And
for some others, the contrary is true.
The third hypothesis is that environmental protection concerns are
receiving an increasingly disinterested or unappreciative audience before
the Court. Historically, those responding to the environmental concerns
included Justices seemingly sympathetic to the kinds of restrictions being
imposed by environmental law, including the kind of evolutionary pressure
those concerns place on existing legal doctrine and lawmaking institutions
and processes. Increasingly, however, those on the Court responding to the
environmental context seem to be dominated by Justices who are affirma-
tively unsympathetic to such environmental concerns and who seem more
interested in resisting and reversing those evolutionary pressures on the law.
Each of these three hypotheses is discussed in more detail below.
1. For Most of the Justices the Environmental Protection Dimension
of a Case Before the Court Does Not Influence Their Vote
The strongest evidence supporting the first hypothesis, which is that
for most of the Justices in most cases the environmental protection dimen-
sion was not a factor affecting their votes, is the paradoxical nature of the
voting patterns if assessed exclusively from an environmental protection
perspective. The more qualitative review of the voting patterns of a few
Justices in selected cases is illustrative.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, for instance, has a reputation in the environ-
mental community for being unsympathetic to environmental protection
HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 716 1999-2000
concerns. There is some basis for that reputation in many of his votes.
Representative examples include his votes in favor of narrowly reading the
scope of federal reserved water rights in national forests in United States v.
New Mexico;49 against enhanced procedural rights for environmentalists in
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC; ° against an interpretation
of the Endangered Species Act in Tennessee Valley Authority5 that barred
the construction of a virtually completed multimillion-dollar dam;2 and in
favor of a more aggressive application of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause in a host of cases, including, for example, both Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City" and Keystone Bituminous Coal.54
But labeling the Chief Justice as somehow "anti-environmental"
becomes more problematic and inappropriate if one considers many of his
other votes that strongly favor environmentally protective outcomes.
Examples include his votes favoring the government's contention in United
States v. Fuller5 that it need not compensate a fee owner in an eminent
domain proceeding for the value of the land attributable to the Taylor
Grazing Act permits applicable to adjacent property; upholding criminal
convictions under section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act in United States
v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp.;6 rejecting federal preemption
claims in favor of sustaining stricter local noise controls in City of Burbank
v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.; construing section 118 of the Clean Air
Act to require federal installations to comply with state air pollution con-
trol requirements in Hancock v. Train;58 dissenting in Japan Whaling Ass'n v.
American Cetacean Society9 along with Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Brennan, contending that the secretary of commerce was required to "cer-
tify" Japan for failing to comply with International Whaling Convention
whaling quotas;0 and providing the critical fifth pro-environmental vote
in California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.,6 in favor of imposi-
tion of state restrictions on federal mining patentees.
49. 438 U.S. 696, 718 (1978).
50. 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978).
51. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
52. See id. at 211 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
53. 438 U.S. 104, 152-53 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. 480 U.S. 470, 520-21 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55. 409 U.S. 488, 488, 490-94 (1973).
56. 411 U.S. 655, 675-76 (1973) (Rehnquist & Black, JJ., dissenting in part).
57. 411 U.S. 624, 650-54 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. 426 U.S. 167, 199 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
60. See id. at 241, 246 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. 480 U.S. 572, 579-94 (1987).
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Indeed, several of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions (unlike those of
Justice White62) stress the importance of the environmental protection
goals as an affirmative reason for upholding the challenged governmental
action. The Chief Justice has, for instance, dissented in a series of dormant
commerce clause cases, including City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,63 Chemical
Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt,64 and Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality,65 in favor of the constitutionality of states'
discriminating against interstate commerce to protect their environments
from solid and hazardous wastes originating in other states. Apart from Justice
Douglas, whose environmentalist tendencies were infamous,66 Rehnquist's
opinions are among the few during the past three decades to emphasize the
pressing nature of environmental problems.67 He is certainly the only Justice
to suggest any appreciation of the roots of claims of environmental injustice.66
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, is generally considered sympathetic
to environmental protection concerns, based on several opinions that he
has authored and joined. These include his opinion for the Court in Keystone
Bituminous Coal,69 sustaining a surface mining law challenged as a regulatory
taking;70 his dissents in both Nollan v. California Coastal Commission" and
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,72 opposing regulatory takings
challenges to state regulation of development on the coastal zone; and his
62. See supra text accompanying note 12.
63. 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64. 504 U.S. 334, 349 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
65. 511 U.S. 93, 108 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
66. See infra note 305 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 504 U.S. at 349-50 (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting) (stating that "States may take actions legitimately directed at the preservation of the State's
natural resources," and that "hazardous waste ... presents risks to the public health and environment
that a State may legitimately wish to avoid"); City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("A growing problem in our Nation is the sanitary treatment and disposal of solid waste.").
68. The Chief Justice's dissents in the dormant commerce clause cases suggest awareness
that technological advances are leading to the siting of waste treatment facilities based on market
dynamics rather than on geographic differences between sites, and the possible unfairness to those
communities that the market, left unchecked, will repeatedly choose. See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc., 511
U.S. at 112-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (permitting the fee differential because "[tihe avail-
ability of environmentally sound landfill space and the proper disposal of solid waste strike me as
justifiable 'safety or health' rationales for the fee," and because "nothing in the Commerce
Clause... compels less densely populated States to serve as the low-cost dumping grounds for
their neighbors"); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504
U.S. 353, 372 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that because of technological
advances, "siting a modem landfill can now proceed largely independent of the landfill location's
particular geological characteristics").
69. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 473 (1987).
70. See id. at 481-502.
71. 483 U.S. 825, 866, 866-67 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. 505 U.S. 1003, 1061, 1075-76 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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dissents in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,v3 arguing for injunctive remedies
for environmental violations,'4 and Secretary of the Interior v. California,7 in
support of enhanced environmental restrictions on oil and gas leasing on
the outer continental shelf.
76
But, as with Chief Justice Rehnquist, a more complicated image emerges
if one considers other Stevens votes, in which he displays no special
sympathy towards environmental protection concerns. These include both
his dissent in Granite Rock,77 in which he would have held preempted state
environmental regulation of mining activities on federal land, and Penn
Central, in which, joining then-Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion,"
Stevens would have ruled against the constitutionality under the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause of a state historic landmark designation law's
application to Grand Central Terminal,79 as well as his dissent in City of
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,"' in which he would have rejected
the Environmental Defense Fund's claim that a federal hazardous waste rule
was insufficiently protective of the environment.8
Justice Stevens's votes in many environmental cases have not only
often been unsympathetic to environmental protection goals but have also
frequently been dispositive of the outcome in the case before the Court.
Stevens supplied the critical fifth votes in United States v. New Mexico, 2 in
which the Court ruled that a reservation of public lands for national forests
did not include the reservation of water rights necessary for aesthetics and
wildlife preservation;83 Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum
Institute,84 in which he also wrote the plurality opinion invalidating the
secretary of labor's benzene rule; and Japan Whaling Ass'n,8 in which the
73. 456 U.S. 305, 322 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 322-23.
75. 464 U.S. 312, 344 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 344-45.
77. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 606 (1987) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
78. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
79. Strictly speaking, the Court's decision in Penn Cenrral does not neatly fit into the
"environmental" category. It is a case concerning historic preservation in an urban setting. I have
included the case in the Article's data set, however, simply because the case's regulatory takings
analysis has served as one of the leading opinions applicable to similar takings challenges brought
against environmental regulations.
80. 511 U.S. 328, 340 (1994) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
81. See id. at 348-49.
82. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
83. See id. at 718.
84. 448 U.S. 607, 611 (1980).
85. See id. at 652-62.
86. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 223 (1986).
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Court ruled that the secretary of commerce was not required to certify Japan
for refusing to abide by the International Whaling Convention whaling
quotas." Finally, during the Court's most recently completed term, Justice
Stevens provided the decisive fifth vote in favor of the property owner's
position in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.s" that it
was entitled under the Seventh Amendment to a jury trial of its regulatory
takings claim based on the city's repeated denials of a development permit,
and that the jury had properly sustained the takings claim.8
A similar pattern emerges with Justice Brennan, who, while generally
considered sympathetic to environmental concerns, authored the environ-
mentalist's nightmare of a dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City
of San Diego,' which subsequently became the Court's holding in First
English9 in favor of a constitutionally compelled remedy of money damages
for regulatory takings. 2 Brennan also provided the fifth vote for upholding
the EPA's variance policy for toxic effluent discharges in Chemical Manu-
facturers Ass'n v. NRDC,93 and he dissented in 1986 in Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States,9" in favor of greater Fourth Amendment limitations on the
government's ability to enforce environmental restrictions through airborne
surveillance techniques. 5
Justice O'Connor's and Justice Marshall's voting histories are suscepti-
ble to a seemingly similar diagnosis. Despite Justice O'Connor's reputation
for generally being less sympathetic to environmental protection concerns,
she joined Justice Blackmun's impassioned dissent in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,96 in favor of environmental citizen suit standing;9 7 and she dissented
both in First English,"s in favor of a government's ability to restrict develop-
87. See id. at 231-41.
88. 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1999).
89. The ruling in favor of the property owner in City of Monterey is especially significant
because it represents the first occasion that the Court has ever upheld a regulatory takings claim
based just on the so-called first prong of the regulatory takings test announced in Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), which considers whether the challenged regulation "substan-
tially advance[s] legitimate state interests." Id.
90. 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, ]., dissenting).
91. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987).
92. See CHARLES M. HAAR & JEROLD S. KAYDEN, LANDMARK JUSTICE: THE INFLUENCE
OFWILLIAMJ. BRENNAN ON AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES 39-43 (1989) (describing Justice Brennan's
dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co.).
93. 470 U.S. 116, 117, 125-34 (1985).
94. 476 U.S. 227, 240 (1986) (Brennan, J., joining a concurring and dissenting opinion by
Powell, J.).
95. See id. at 252.
96. 504 U.S. 555, 589 (1992) (O'Connor, J., joining a dissenting opinion by Blackmun, J.).
97. See id. at 594-606.
98. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., joining in part a dissenting opinion by Stevens, J.).
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ment in a floodplain, 9 and in Chemical Manufacturers," in which she (unlike
Justice Brennan) supported the NRDC's more environmentally protective
reading of the Clean Water Act."' Justice O'Connor also voted in favor of
state environmental protection measures in Granite Rock, °2 and she authored
the opinion for the Court in PUD No. I v. Washington Department of Ecology,"
which endorsed a broad reading of state environmental authority over
federally licensed hydroelectric facilities that environmentalists widely hail.' °4
Justice Marshall who was generally considered more sympathetic to environ-
mental concerns, however, provided the fifth vote against the Clean Air Act
criminal prosecution in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States; °5 like Brennan,
Marshall dissented in the Dow Chemical case;'- and, perhaps most
significantly, Marshall authored the Court's opinion in Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., °7 which, to the great dismay of
environmentalists, severely limited the reach and effectiveness of citizen suit
enforcement under the Clean Water Act.'
Based on this broader, qualitative, and ultimately impressionistic review
of the voting in environmental cases, there is simply too much cacophony
in the votes of individual Justices to support a thesis that environmental
protection concerns are generally a primary motivating factor in the Court's
decisions and the votes of the Justices. The counterexamples are too many.
2. The Voting Records of a Few Justices Suggest that the Environmental
Protection Dimension of a Case Affected Their Resolution
of the Legal Issue Before the Court
There are nonetheless some individual tendencies that become dis-
cernible upon even closer examination of the Justices' votes in environ-
mental cases. A more quantitative review of the voting patterns suggests
99. See id. at 322-23.
100. 470 U.S. 116, 165 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
101. See id. at 165.
102. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 579-94 (1987).
103. 511 U.S. 700, 703 (1994). See generally Katherine P. Ransel, The Sleeping Giant Awakens:
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, 25 ENVTL. L. 255 (1995).
104. See PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 710-13.
105. 434 U.S. 275, 276 (1978).
106. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240 (1986) (Marshall, J., joining a
concurring and dissenting opinion by Powell, J.).
107. 484 U.S. 49, 52 (1987).
108. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.3, at 289 (2d ed. 1994)
("The Supreme Court has rolled back citizen suits in a variety of ways. But the most serious setback
is the Court's holding in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation... [which] com-
bines poor lawyering with unconvincing semantics and bad history.").
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that a few individual Justices were more likely to rule in favor of or against
an environmentally protective outcome because of that outcome's environ-
mental dimension.
The more quantitative analysis of the voting of the Justices is not
based on all 243 cases. It is instead based on their votes in the potentially
more telling cases: a subset of approximately 100 cases that more readily
lend themselves to "pro" or "anti" environmental protection assignment for
scoring purposes." The objective of this analysis is to construct a scoring
system somewhat analogous to that employed by the League of Conserva-
tion Voters Test in scoring members of Congress on environmental mat-
ters.10 Here, however, it is applied to the Justices. A Justice is awarded one
point for each pro-environmental protection outcome for which the Justice
voted. The final score, referred to hereinafter as an "EP score," is based on
the percentage of pro-environmental votes the Justice cast out of those
cases within the 100-case sample in which that Justice participated. An EP
score of 100 means that a Justice voted for the environmentally protective
outcome in all the cases in which he or she participated. A score of zero
means that the Justice voted for that environmental outcome in none of
the cases.
There is inevitably arbitrariness and sometimes downright foolishness
in attempting any such "pro" or "anti" policy assignments to Supreme Court
rulings, especially assignments that purport to be binary in nature (i.e., for
or against). The problem, of course, is two-fold. First, most cases do not
lend themselves to the assignment of one of two opposing labels. There are
more typically an array of possible outcomes with their different policy impli-
cations less stark than polar opposites. Second, in most instances, it is also
undoubtedly true that whether a particular outcome happened to be more or
less environmentally protective had little, if any, impact on an individual
Justice's decision to vote one way rather than another. That is, the environ-
mental implications were often not the motivating force behind the vote.
They were simply an incidental factor that the Justice deemed not relevant
to the legal issue before the Court, whether that issue was a question of
administrative law and standards of judicial review applicable to administra-
tive agency action,"' corporate law relating to parent corporate responsibil-
109. A listing of those 100 cases appears infra in Appendix C. That listing includes both a
breakdown of the voting and a designation of either the majority, concurring, or dissenting posi-
tion as receiving the "EP" score in that case.
110. See League of Conservation Voters, National Environmental Scorecards (visited Jan. 14,
2000) <http://www.lcv.org/scorecards/index.htm>.
111. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-45 (1984).
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ity for the actions of subsidiary corporations,"2 or Tenth Amendment law
concerning the limitations that amendment imposes on the federal govern-
ment's authority to compel certain actions by state governments.3
This Article seeks to account for the first concern at least to some
extent by relying only upon the subset of approximately 100 cases rather
than the full 243-case sample. The second threshold concern-the likeli-
hood that individual Justices were not motivated, in any event, by environ-
mental concerns-properly cautions against gleaning great meaning from
small differences in scores in either a relative or an absolute sense. But so
long as one confines conclusions to those Justices whose EP scores are at
either the very high end or the very low end, some interesting conclusions
can fairly be drawn. To that end, this Article deliberately accords no espe-
cial meaning to scores between the two extremes, even largely differing
scores. Those differences are not deemed to provide a fair basis for positing
that the environmental protection dimension of the case played more than
an incidental role.
But for those few Justices with scores either very high or very low, it is
at least plausible to theorize that the environmental protection dimension
influenced their vote one way or the other. A fair case can be made for
scores above sixty-six or below thirty-three. Moreover, a strong case can be
made that scores above seventy-five or below twenty-five reflect pronounced
tendencies in environmental cases.
Beyond that essential interpretive limitation, however, this Article
deliberately does not otherwise try to remove cases from the sample based
on the possibility, even the potential likelihood, that the environmental
context may have had nothing to do with the Justice's decision to vote one
way rather than another. This is not done precisely because it is the very
phenomenon this Article explores: Whether the trends in the votes of indi-
vidual Justices suggest that the environmental context of a case influenced
their vote in a direction either consistent or inconsistent with environmental
protection concerns; or, alternatively, whether the votes of the individual
Justices instead create the impression that environmental protection is little
more than a factual context for them in their resolution of legal issues, but
lacking any independent jurisprudential content related to the environment.
One cannot test a hypothesis by gathering data that conclusively presumes
its invalidity.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998).
113. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992); EPA v. Brown, 431
U.S. 99,100 (1977).
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With these threshold caveats, most of the numerical scores for the nine-
teen Justices simply confirm what was suggested by the prior, more qualitative
analysis, which is that the environmental protection aspect of the case had
no discernible impact on the Justice's vote. Justice White, for instance,
received a score of thirty-six, which is at the low end. But a thirty-six is still
within the broad middle ground that does not suggest any discernible influ-
ence one way or the other.
14
For certain Justices, however, some clear patterns do emerge. For a very
few, the scores suggest that they systematically favored a policy outcome
that promoted environmental protection. For some others, and there were
more in this camp, their scores suggested at least some skepticism, if not
some affirmative hostility. Although the identities of some of these Justices
are likely obvious to Court watchers, there are nonetheless a few surprises.
(The results appear graphically on the following page and are also compiled
in Appendix D.)
With regard to those Justices who were the most environmentally pro-
tective, however, the high scores are both easy to identify and not especially
surprising. The highest score went to Justice Douglas. He scored 100. Justice
Douglas may well be the only environmental justice ever on the Court,
at least in modem times.'1 5 And, notwithstanding his high profile, Justice
Douglas was, as a practical matter, barely there for modem environmental
114. It may also be problematic to compare Justices who served at very different times on
the Court-for instance, Justice Stewart and Justice Souter-because the nature of the issues and
lower court rulings coming before the Court may have changed substantially during their respec-
tive years of service on the Court. This could, of course, be the result of changes in the Court
itself, which would still be relevant to my inquiry, but it also might occur because of changes in
the lower courts, in Congress, or within the executive branch. A more liberal appellate judiciary,
for instance, could make the Supreme Court look more conservative to the extent that it was
reversing those lower court rulings. Similarly, an executive branch agency seeking to cut back on
environmental protection by stretching its authority beyond legitimate bounds would, by forcing
those issues on the Supreme Court, make the Court look more environmentally inclined to the
extent that the Court rejected the agency's decisions. In short, the Court could, in theory, remain
constant while its rulings appeared more or less favorable to the environment because of changes
occurring elsewhere in government that systematically affected the issues and rulings presented to
the Court. See Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Tak-
ings, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 591, 611 (1998) ("[TIhe issues that come before the Court and are thus
available for doctrinal development are a function of the legislation and regulation that capture
the fancy of the political majority.").
115. The "modern times" caveat here acknowledges that there were Justices, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes in particular, who authored opinions at a time when environmental law con-
sisted of little more than the common law and who expressed some environmental ethic. See,
e.g., Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); see also New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) ("A river is
more than an amenity, it is a treasure."). Of course, Justice Holmes's votes were not all favoring
environmental protection goals. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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I "IScorws by Justice
law. Because he resigned from the Court in 1975, he voted in only fifteen
of the approximately 100 cases surveyed for the EP score. I ls persistence in
voting nonetheless for the pro-environmental side in each of those cases, no
matter what the legal issue before the Court, is quite striking.
The next highest EP scores are those of Justices Ginsburg, Marshall,
Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter. " 6 Each of their scores, however,
is not only much lower than Justice l)ouglas's, but also below the score
(sixty-six) that I am willing to characterize as even roughly suggesting that
environmental concerns served as a motivating factor. Justice Ginsburg's is
the highest at sixty-three, but her case sample is still so low (eleven) as to
further undermine any hypothesis explaining her relatively pro-environmental
record. Brennan (58.5) and Marshall (61.3) scored just below and just above
sixty, respectively, participating in over eighty of the surveyed cases. Justice
Stevens scored only fifty (also reflecting participation in over eighty cases).
116. The scores of both Justice Black (75) and Justice Breyer (66.6) are actually both higher,
but they are based on too few cases to be telling. Black voted in only four of the cases, and Breyer
in only six.
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Perhaps the most promising Justice today is Justice Souter, who scored fifty-
117
seven.
Although few think of Justice Blackmun in relation to environmental
law, Blackmun's voice on environmental issues was considerable. As in much
of his work as a Justice,"' Blackmun transformed himself in the environ-
mental area. In the early years, his strong tendency was to vote in a manner
antagonistic to environmental interests, though he did not himself author
the majority or dissenting opinions that he joined. He accordingly dissented
in Tennessee Valley Authority,"9 voted with the majority against attorney
fees recovery in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,' and simi-
larly voted with the majority in the United States v. New Mexico reserved
water rights case.' But commencing with the 1985 October Term, Justice
Blackmun's votes reflect a very different judicial attitude towards environ-
mental protection concerns.
Considering just the thirty-five cases in which he participated from the
October Term 1985 until his retirement, his EP score was seventy-six. In his
final fifteen cases, moreover, Blackmun voted on the environmentally pro-
tective side fourteen times, for an EP score of 93.5. Justice Blackmun wrote
passionately in those cases. His opinions include environmental rhetoric
reminiscent of the 1970s. In Lucas,' Justice Blackmun's dissent accuses the
majority of "launch[ing] a missile to kill a mouse."'2 In Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,24 his dissent emotionally denounces the majority for its "slash-and-
bum" through the "law of environmental standing.' 2
Applying my criteria, however, only two Justices cross the barrier at the
high end: Justice Douglas, of course, and the transformed Justice Blackmun.
None of the others (including Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Souter) has
a sufficiently high EP score to suggest that the environmental protection
dimension of the various cases before the Court was a factor influencing their
respective votes.
117. Environmentalists are especially hopeful about Justice Souter based on the tenor of
opinions he has authored, see, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), opinions he
joined as a state supreme court justice, see, e.g., Rowe v. Town of N. Hampton, 553 A.2d 1331
(N.H. 1989), and his apparently strong personal interest in the outdoors, see infra note 311.
118. See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Blackmun, Author of Abortion Right, Dies, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 1999, at Al.
119. 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (Blackmun, J., joining a dissenting opinion by Powell, J.).
120. 421 U.S. 240, 240 (1975).
121. 438 U.S. 696, 696 (1978).
122. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
123. Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
124. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
125. See id. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The low EP scores are, by contrast, more telling. They identify several
Justices with EP scores small enough to suggest some possible skepticism, or
perhaps even hostility, towards environmental protection concerns or the kind
of legal regime they promote. There are many EP scores below thirty-three,
and still many below thirty, and two even below twenty-five. As with the
high EP scores, here too there is a hands-down winner, though no score of zero
to offset Justice Douglas's score of 100. And, as with Justice Douglas, there
are no surprises in terms of identity at the lowest of the low end of the scores.
The lowest score goes to Justice Scalia with a thirteen. That is a strik-
ingly low score. It is a score so low that one can fairly posit that Justice
Scalia perceives environmental protection concerns as systematically pro-
moting a set of legal rules antithetical to those he generally favors. His con-
cerns seem related to the ways in which environmental protection concerns
may promote governmental authority at the expense of individual autonomy,
such as in the exercise of property rights. They also seem related to the ways
in which environmental protection promotes an expansive judicial oversight
role for the federal judiciary, federal mandates to state governmental authori-
ties, and a far-reaching interpretation of congressional Commerce Clause
authority.1
26
Indeed, the kind of legal regime promoted by environmental law seems
to be of sufficient concern that it even prompts Justice Scalia sometimes to
abandon what otherwise appear to be his views on core matters involving
constitutional and statutory interpretation. Thus, in Lucas, Justice Scalia's
opinion for the Court relies upon a very un-Scalia-like notion of a "con-
stitutional culture" to support the Court's ruling in favor of the property
owner challenging environmental regulation as a regulatory taking. 2 In
PUD No. I v. Washington Department of Ecology,28 Justice Scalia is fairly
126. Environmental law can justly be characterized as classically representative of the New
Deal/Great Society constitutional regime that many on the current Court, with Justice Scalia at
the ideological helm, seem to be questioning. See generally McUsic, supra note 114, at 618-20;
Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the
Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29 (1999). Expansive congressional
Commerce Clause authority, diminished states' rights, eroding private property rights, and relaxed
citizen suit standing are all features of modem environmental law, and each has been questioned
by recent Court decisions.
127. See also Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices
Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25, 61-63 (1994); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and
Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 311-
28 (1993). Compare Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 ("[Tlhat the State may subsequently eliminate all
economically valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings
Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture."), with Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Constitution says absolutely nothing
about it .... ).
128. 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
Restoring What's Environmental 727
HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 727 1999-2000
accused by a colleague of abandoning his adherence to the plain meaning of
statutory language in order to embrace a less environmentally protective
statutory construction of the Clean Water Act.29
Perhaps most revealing, however, is the language Scalia uses in his
opinions discussing environmental protection concerns. Justice Scalia plainly
takes great pride in his writing. Unlike Justice White,' Scalia writes with
much passion and flair that strongly reflects his own voice. His treatment
of environmental protection concerns is, at the very least, highly skeptical
of their efficacy and frequently borders on the disdainful.'
Ultimately, however, Justice Scalia's votes and rhetoric simply confirm
what he has previously written in a nonjudicial setting, where he has taken
pains to single out environmental protection laws as especially problematic.
In a 1983 law review article then-Judge Scalia wrote before joining the Court,
he decried the judiciary's apparent "long love affair with environmental
litigation."'' 2 And in response to those 1970s judges who embraced the
propriety of special solicitude to environmental protection claims, Scalia
made it quite explicit that he thought that it would be a "good thing, too"
to have policies such as those furthered by federal environmental protection
law get "lost and misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureauc-
racy.' 3' According to the Justice, "[t]he ability to lose or misdirect laws can
be said to be one of the prime engines of social change.' 34
129. Justice Scalia is well known for his promotion of "plain meaning" judicial construction
of statutory language. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). Justice Stevens in PUD No. I goes out of his way to chide Justice
Scalia (and Justice Thomas) for their dissent in that case because of what he perceives to be a
departure from plain meaning to reach a policy objective more favorable to the regulated
community. See PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 723 (Stevens, J., concurring).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
131. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176-77 (1997) (stating that the goal of the
Endangered Species Act "is to avoid needless economic dislocation produced by agency officials
zealously but unintelligently pursuing their environmental objectives"); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992).
Respondents' other theories are called, alas, the "animal nexus" approach, whereby any-
one who has an interest in studying or seeing the endangered animals anywhere on the
globe has standing; and the "vocational nexus" approach, under which anyone with a pro-
fessional interest in such animals can sue. Under these theories, anyone who goes to see
Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, and anyone who is a keeper of Asian elephants in the
Bronx Zoo, has standing to sue because the Director of the Agency for International
Development (AID) did not consult with the Secretary regarding the AID-funded proj-
ect in Sri Lanka. This is beyond all reason.
Id.
132. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881,884 (1983).
133. Id. at 897.
134. Id. Justice Scalia is responding to Judge Skelly Wright's famous statement in Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109,
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Although Scalia's EP score is the most striking, he is not the lone Jus-
tice with an extremely low score. Not surprisingly, Justice Thomas has the
next lowest score (twenty), though this score is less telling because the case
sample is relatively low (twenty cases). Justice O'Connor is at 30.9, and both
former Chief Justice Burger (34.3) and current Chief Justice Rehnquist (36.5)
have scores just above thirty-three.
One Justice with a possibly surprising EP score below thirty-three is
Justice Powell, at thirty. Justice Powell's general reputation is as a traditional
conservative but with strongly moderating tendencies.'35 Whatever the accu-
racy of that characterization applied broadly, it is much less validly applied
to Powell's voting patterns in environmental protection cases. In fact, even
Justice Powell's already very low EP score is likely inflated because of the
large number of environmental cases (nine) in which he recused himself
from participating while on the Court."'
The basis for those recusals, Justice Powell's legal experience in private
practice before joining the Court, also likely explains his apparent deeply
held skepticism of the efficacy and fairness of the environmental protection
laws of the 1970s. Justice Powell had been a Hunton & Williams attorney
in Richmond, Virginia. While at the law firm, Powell himself represented
industry, including the Albermarle Paper Company and its ultimate acquisi-
tion, Ethyl Corporation."' These were not incidental clients, but rather
were among the first of his major clients that "made Powell an independent
force in Hunton, Williams."'38 Hunton & Williams was then and remains
today one of the country's leading environmental law firms, with a reputa-
tion as providing zealous, aggressive representation to industry (especially the
electric utility industry) in environmental litigation. For years, the head of
that practice was George Freeman, who was at Hunton & Williams with
Powell. Freeman was a longtime close personal friend and someone who
played a significant role in promoting Powell for the opening on the Court.39
Powell accordingly recused himself in several major environmental cases
before the Court. They included cases in which his former clients were
1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (declaring that it was the court's "duty, in short .... to see that important
legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hall.
ways of the federal bureaucracy").
135. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV.
409, 409 (1987).
136. See infra notes 140-157 and accompanying text.
137. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 125, 189-93 (1994). Because
of Powell's status at the firm, it was named Hunton, Williams, Gay, Moore & Powell in 1954. See
id. at 130.
138. See id. at 126.
139. See id. at 230-31; George Clemon Freeman, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
101 HARV. L. REV. 404, 408-09 (1987).
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parties" and, early on, cases in which Hunton & Williams represented an
amicus before the Court.'4 ' Powell strived to be known for being especially
scrupulous on recusals and took great personal umbrage at any accusations
142that he had failed to recuse himself when he should have done so. The
upshot was that Powell sat out of many major environmental cases, including
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Baltimore Gas & Electric
Co. v. NRDC,'" E. 1. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,'45 EPA v. National
Crushed Stone Ass'n,"6 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP)'47 and Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Challeng-
ing Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),'48 Train v. NRDC,"9 and Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y.'50
The single most remarkable recusal, though, occurred in Fri v. Sierra
Club. "'' Before the Court in Fri was the Sierra Club's contention (upheld by
the lower courts) that Congress intended in the Clean Air Act to require
the EPA to establish a program that prevented "significant deterioration" of
air quality in those parts of the country that met the stringent air quality
standards the EPA had promulgated pursuant to the act. As a strict matter
of statutory interpretation, Sierra Club's argument was fairly weak. Hunton
& Williams filed an amicus brief in the Court in support of the EPA's posi-
tion that no such program was statutorily required. 2 Presumably as a direct
result, however, Powell recused himself from the case and the Court ended up
affirming the court of appeals ruling in favor of the Sierra Club, by an equally
divided four-to-four vote. 3 The prevention-of-significant-deterioration
140. When Hunton & Williams served as counsel for a party, it was usually George Freeman
who argued for industry, and Justice Powell routinely recused himself. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 108 (1983); EPA v. National
Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 85 (1980); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train, 430 U.S. 112, 139 (1977).
141. See, e.g., Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 99 (1975); Fri
v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541, 542 (1973).
142. See JEFFRIES, supra note 137, at 274-81.
143. See 435 U.S. at 558.
144. See 462 U.S. at 108.
145. See 430 U.S. at 139.
146. See 449 U.S. 64, 85 (1980).
147. See 412 U.S. 669, 699 (1973).
148. See 422 U.S. 289, 328 (1975).
149. See 421 U.S. 60, 99 (1975).
150. See 421 U.S. 240, 271 (1975).
151. 412 U.S. 541, 542 (1973).
152. See id. at 541 n.* (listing Henry V. Nickel for the Edison Electric Institute as amicus curiae).
153. The official papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall reveal that the Sierra Club was originally
poised to lose by a five-to-three vote in an opinion for the Court authored by Justice Stewart, until
Justice Marshall switched his vote to the Sierra Club, thereby prompting both the tie vote and the
730
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program, which Congress subsequently codified into law,' has since become
a major aspect of federal environmental law.'55  Perhaps for that reason, 156
not long after the Fri affirmance, Justice Powell stopped recusing himself
from cases in which Hunton & Williams's involvement was limited to their
117appearance as amicus curiae in the case.
But when not recused, Powell served up judicial rhetoric that some-
times surpasses even Scalia's in its skepticism of federal environmental pro-
tection laws. In Union Electric Co. v. EPA,5' he referred to the Clean Air
Act as "Draconian" and went so far as to suggest the propriety of its con-
gressional revision. 9 In Tennessee Valley Authority," he decried the Court's
interpretation of the Endangered Species Act as an "absurd result" that
"casts a long shadow over the operation of even the most important proj-
ects, serving vital needs of society and national defense."'' . As with the
Clean Air Act, Powell expressly invited Congress to overrule, in effect, the
majority ruling from which he was dissenting.'62
Court's affirmation by an equally divided Court. See Letter from Justice Thurgood Marshall to
Justice Stewart 1 (June 5, 1973) (on file with the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
154. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (1994).
155. See Craig N. Oren, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus Site-
Shifting, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2-7 (1988).
156. One can fairly speculate that Hunton & Williams and their industry clients were extremely
displeased that their amicus filing prompted Justice Powell's recusal and, hence, their self-inflicted
loss on such a significant issue. I possess no knowledge as to whether Powell was ever aware of any
such possible displeasure or subsequently changed his recusal policy as a direct result.
157. See Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 2 (1976).
158. 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
159. See id. at 272 (Powell, J., concurring).
The result apparently required by this legislation.., could sacrifice the well-being of a large
metropolitan area through the imposition of inflexible demands that may be technologi-
cally impossible to meet and indeed may no longer even be necessary to the attainment
of the goal of clean air.
I believe that Congress, if fully aware of this Draconian possibility, would strike a
different balance.
Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
160. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
161. See id. at 195-96 (Powell, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 210 (Powell, J., dissenting).
I have little doubt that Congress will amend the Endangered Species Act to prevent
the grave consequences made possible by today's decision. Few, if any, Members of that
body will wish to defend an interpretation of the Act that requires the waste of at least $53
million, and denies the people of the Tennessee Valley area the benefits of the reservoir
that Congress intended to confer. There will be little sentiment to leave this dam standing
before an empty reservoir, serving no purpose other than a conversation piece for incredu-
lous tourists.
Id. (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation and footnote omitted). Justice Powell's opinion for the majority
in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), is likewise notable for its aggressiveness
in ensuring that regulated industry is not subject to competing state environmental regulators, by
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One can, however, contrast Justice Powell's skepticism towards strin-
gent environmental protection laws with a far more sympathetic approach
he displayed towards more traditional natural resources conservation laws,
which fell outside of those areas within the core concerns of his apparent
experiences with corporate clients in private practice. Justice Powell authored
a strongly pro-environmental dissent in United States v. New Mexico,"'
denouncing what he characterized as the majority's view of forests as "still,
silent, lifeless places.""' Sounding more like Aldo Leopold'65 than like a former
industry counsel, Powell urged the Court both to consider that "the forests
consist of the birds, animals, and fish-the wildlife-that inhabit them, as well
as the trees, flowers, shrubs, and grasses" and to accept the "modem view of
the forest as an interdependent, dynamic community of plants and animals."1"
Although to very different effect, Powell seemingly spoke in United
States v. New Mexico from personal experience. But unlike in the other
cases, which he approached as former industry counsel, here it was Powell
the life-long hunter of small game who was speaking.167 And, like many
hunters, he apparently harbored some special appreciation of wildlife and
the essential ecological needs of their habitats such as national forests,
which are managed for multiple purposes, one of which is hunting.
1 68
Perhaps similar personal experiences explain Powell's otherwise sur-
prising vote in Penn Central.69 Powell joined Justice Brennan's majority
extending the Clean Water Act's preemptive reach to even choice of law rules. See id. at 499; id.
at 500 (Brennan, J., concurring).
163. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
164. See id. at 719 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("I do not agree, however, that the forests which Con-
gress intended to 'improve and protect' are the still, silent, lifeless places envisioned by the Court.").
165. See generally Aldo Leopold, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND
THERE (1949).
166. See New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 719, 723 n.4.
167. See JEFFRIES, supra note 137, at 24-25, 205, 215.
168. Many hunters are closely associated with conservationist interests because of their
appreciation of the outdoors, including forests and their wildlife. Aldo Leopold, no doubt one of the
nation's most famous environmentalists, was himself a hunter. See Richard L. Knight, The Role
of Private and Public Lands in the Development of Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic, 19 J. LAND RESOURCES
& ENVTL. L. 9, 13 (1999); Eric T. Freyfogle, On the Trail of the Land Ethic, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV.
913, 914 (reviewing ROUND RIVER: FROM THE JOURNALS OF ALDO LEOPOLD (Luna B. Leopold
ed., 1991), ALDO LEOPOLD'S WILDERNESS (David E. Brown & Neil B. Carmony eds., 1990), and
THE RIVER OF THE MOTHER OF GOD AND OTHER ESSAYS (Susan L. Flader & J. Baird Callicott
eds., 1991)); see also R. Shep Melnick, Risky Business: Government and the Environment After Earth
Day, in TAKING STOCK: AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 156, 161
(Morton Keller & R. Shep Melnick eds., 1999) ("[E]nvironmentalism has become a 'big tent' that
covers a variety of divergent interests. For example, members of the 'hook and bullet set' hope to
kill the very wildlife that 'bird and bunny' groups are trying to protect." (citation omitted)). The
Federal Land Policy & Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994), expressly
contemplates hunting within national forests. See id. § 1732(b).
169. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S..104, 106 (1978).
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opinion for the Court upholding New York City's historic landmark desig-
nation law and rejecting a regulatory takings challenge.17° One of Justice
Powell's first major clients at Hunton & Williams was Colonial Williams-
burg, and in that capacity he represented that city in defending its historic
preservation rules.' Powell, however, displayed no such deference to gov-
ernmental land use planning challenged as a regulatory taking when the
object of restrictions was the kind of surface mining of coal prevalent in his
home state of Virginia. He joined the dissenters in Keystone Bituminous
Coal,' in which he favored striking down as an unconstitutional taking a
state law restricting surface mining of coal because of its adverse economic
impact on the owner of the coal estate.'73 And, while joining the Court's
unanimous rejection of a facial takings challenge to surface mining restric-
tions in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,"' he also
wrote separately to express his concern that "[t]he Act could affect seriously
the owners and lessees of the land and coal in the seven westernmost coun-
ties of Virginia" and that, for this reason, future as-applied challenges might
well be meritorious.
75
Finally, Justice Kennedy's EP score is especially noteworthy precisely
because he appears to be the Court's current bellwether Justice in environ-
mental cases. 176 His score, 25.9 is the third lowest out of nineteen Justices
over the past thirty years. For those primarily concerned about environ-
mental law, it must be unsettling to learn that 25.9 represents the Court's
current point of equilibrium.
The statistics here, however, may well mask significant pro-environmental
protection potential. Although Justice Kennedy's writing in the area remains
sparse, 7 he filed concurring opinions in three cases in which he expressed
views that create at least the theoretical possibility of his breaking away
from Justice Scalia's approach. In Lucas, Justice Kennedy expressed a view
170. See id. at 138.
171. See JEFFRIES, supra note 137, at 128-29. But even in Penn Central, the oral argument
transcript in the case shows Powell's focus on the relevance of "economic viability" in deciding the
constitutionality of the challenged police power restriction, which is a notion he then elevated from
an incidental footnote in Penn Central to one part of a two-part takings test in Agins. See Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Official Oral Argument Transcript at 41-44, Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (argued Apr. 17, 1978). The
"economic viability" prong, moreover, subsequently gave birth to Justice Scalia's per se takings test in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-19 (1992).
172. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
173. See id. at 506, 520-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
174. 452 U.S. 264, 266 (1981).
175. See id. at 305, 307 (Powell, J., concurring).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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of environmental regulation, private property, and the Fifth Amendment
far more open to the need for strict controls on the development of fragile
ecosystems than Justice Scalia's majority opinion for the Court.171 In Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, Kennedy's concurring opinion took issue with
Scalia's view of citizen suits by contending that Congress retained the author-
ity, notwithstanding Article III, to extend standing to plaintiffs whose inju-
ries were less concrete and dependent on more attenuated chains of causation
than present under common law approaches.179 Finally, during the October
Term 1997, in the nonenvironmental case of Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,' 80
Justice Kennedy rejected Scalia's plurality opinion for the Court, which
relied on an expansive view of regulatory takings doctrine, in favor of a sub-
stantive due process approach more favored by environmentalists and govern-
ment regulators.'
178. Justice Kennedy rejected the majority's core holding that background principles of the
common law provide an exclusive basis for excusing a police power measure that deprives a land
owner of all economically viable use of the property. He singled out "fragile land system[s]" as
potentially justifying heightened governmental regulation. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032-36 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Richard J. Lazarus, Counting
Votes and Discounting Holdings in the Supreme Court's Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1099, 1131-40 (1997).
179. Justice Kennedy's separate opinion in Lujan expressly acknowledged that
[a]s Government programs and policies become more complex and far reaching, we must
be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in
our common-law tradition.... In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none
existed before ....
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
180. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
181. See id. at 539-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's most recent majority
opinion for the Court in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 119 S. Ct. 1624
(1999), although affirming the jury verdict in favor of the developer's Fifth Amendment regula-
tory takings challenge, is also helpful to government regulators in several respects. The majority
rejected the Ninth Circuit's application of the "rough proportionality" analysis set forth by the
Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994), and Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987), as inapposite outside the context of a challenge to a land use
exaction. See City of Monterey, 119 S. Ct. at 1635. The majority opinion also took pains to stress
the narrowness of its ruling sustaining the jury instructions in City of Monterey and upholding the
propriety of a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in a regulatory takings case. See id. at
1644-45; id. at 1631 ("The controlling question is whether, given the city's apparent concession that
the instructions were a correct statement of the law, the matter was properly submitted to the jury."
(emphasis added)); id. at 1636 ("Given the posture of the case before us, we decline the suggestions
of amici to revisit these precedents." (emphasis added)); id. at 1637 ("In short, the question sub-
mitted to the jury on this issue was confined to whether, in light of all the history and the context of
the case, the city's particular decision to deny Del Monte Dunes' final development proposal was
reasonably related to the city's proffered justifications." (emphasis added)); id. ("[The Court of
Appeals did not adopt a rule of takings law allowing wholesale interference ... with... routine
regulatory decisions." (emphasis added)); id. at 1644 ("In this case, the narrow question submitted
to the jury was whether, when viewed in light of the context and protracted history of the devel-
opment application process, the city's decision to reject a particular development plan bore a rea-
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3. The Individual Voting Records of the Justices in Environmental Cases
Suggest an Overall Trend Towards Environmental Concerns' Being
Less Favored by the Court
A third finding suggested by the individual EP scores is that the Court
as a whole is steadily becoming less responsive to environmental protection.
Indeed, the overall shift in the fate of environmental protection before the
Court during the past three decades is dramatic.
One striking comparison is to consider the EP scores of the Justices on
the Court in 1975 to those on the Court today. For the purposes of this
comparison, the EP scores used are those of the Justices for their entire
career (as of today) rather than the date selected. In 1975, there were no
Justices with an EP score of twenty or lower, only one score of thirty-three
or lower, and one Justice with a score over sixty-six. By 1999, the number
of Justices with an EP score of twenty or lower has increased from zero to
two, and the number of EP scores of thirty-three or lower has increased from
one to four. At the same time, the number of Justices with EP scores over
sixty-six has fallen from one to zero.
Another slightly more finely tuned comparison is to contrast the EP
scores of the Justices in each of the three decades, but based on their votes
within those respective decades.182 This second comparison reveals the
same trend, albeit a bit more dampened than the first. The single largest
lowering of EP scores occurs between the 19 70s and the 1980s. The 1990s
sonable relationship to its proffered justifications.... Under these circumstances, we hold that it was
proper to submit this narrow, factbound question to the jury." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
182. For the purposes of this compilation, the EP score of each Justice is based solely on his
or her votes within a particular decade. For instance, because Chief Justice Rehnquist served on
the Court during all three decades, separate EP scores were calculated based on his votes in each
of the relevant time periods. For some of the Justices, their EP scores shifted substantially from one
decade to the next. Here again, the Chief Justice is illustrative. For the Court Terms commencing
in the 19 70s, 1980s, and 1990s, Rehnquist had EP scores of 38.2, 26.8, and 42.8, respectively.
Such shifts may be telling to the extent that they reflect either the changing nature of the issues
and rulings before the Court or the Justices' views on those issues. Yet they may also be misleading if
too quickly read as indicative of the latter. The nature of the issues before the Court as well as the
precise rulings under review may just as well be a reflection of changing circumstances external to
the Court, such as the relative ideologies dominant in state courts and lower federal courts, as well
as in executive branch agencies, state legislatures, and Congress. See supra note 114. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's considerably higher score in the 1990s, for instance, largely resulted from his defense
of aggressive action by states during that time period to limit the import of solid and hazardous
waste into their borders. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68. Finally, the table in the text
above deliberately omits the EP score of any Justice who voted in fewer than ten cases during the
relevant decade. Thus, neither the EP scores of Justices Black and Harlan, who voted in only four
and three cases respectively during the 1970s, nor those of Marshall and Breyer, who voted in only
one and six cases respectively during the 1990s, is reflected in the table. The case sample for each
was simply too small (especially for Marshall with only one case).
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maintain the decrease but do not match the level of its acceleration that
occurs in the 1980s.
By Decade - The Environmental Protection Scores
of the Justices
At the high end, the number of Justices with an EP score of sixty-six or
more decreases from three during the 1970s to zero in the 1980s, and to just
one in the 1990s. At the low end, the number of Justices with a score of
thirty-three or lower goes from one in the 1970s down to five in the 1980s,
and further decreases to three in the 1990s, while those with a score of twenty
or below goes from zero to one to two during those three decades.
No doubt each of these two comparisons contains significant flaws.
But precise quantification is not necessary if the sole purpose of the inquiry
is to ascertain whether there are any clear overall trends rather than to make
fine distinctions. The downward trends in the EP scores of the Justices
during the past three decades easily display that level of clarity. 83
1I. THE JUSTICES' APATHY AND POSSIBLE ANTIPATHY TOWARDS
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATURE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The overall trends should be troubling for those looking to the Supreme
Court for an affirmative interest in promoting environmental protection.
183. At least in theory, however, statistics about trends in the votes of individual Justices do
not inexorably establish similar trends in the decisions of the Court. For instance, 40 environ-
mentally favorable votes could reflect five unanimous rulings or nine five-four rulings. For that same
reason, 27 environmentally favorable votes might only mean three Court rulings in favor of the
environment, while 20 favorable votes could be four favorable rulings. Absent such unanticipated
discrepancies between votes and Court rulings, it seems fair to draw inferences about the latter
from trends in the former. The more significant limitation upon such temporally based statistical
comparisons is the very real possibility that the trends revealed may reflect differences in the issues
presented to the Court rather than differences in the Court itself. See supra note 114.
Decade/EP Scores > 80 > 66 < 33 5 20
1970-79 October 1 3 1 0
Terms
1980-89 October 0 0 5 1
Terms
1990-98 October 1 1 3 2
Terms
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Environmental protection concerns implicated by a case appear, at best, to
play no favored role in shaping the outcome, which is a sharp departure from
what many judges in the 1970s conceived of as the proper judicial function
in environmental law.' But nor does the outcome seem wholly neutral or
indifferent to the presence of those concerns.
Instead, environmental protection concerns seem increasingly over the
past three decades to be serving a disfavored role in influencing the Court's
outcome. The preferred outcome is one that places less rather than more
weight on the need to promote environmental protection. The Court's deci-
sions and the attitudes of the individual Justices reflect increasing skepticism
of the efficacy of environmental protection goals and the various laws that
seek their promotion.'
Even more fundamentally, however, the Court's rulings and the opin-
ions and votes of the Justices suggest the relative absence of any notion that
environmental law is a distinct area of law, as opposed to just a collection of
legal issues incidentally arising in a factual setting in which environmental
protection concerns are what is at stake. The Court's opinions lack any dis-
tinct environmental voice. Missing is any emphasis on the nature, charac-
ter, and normative weightiness of environmental protection concerns and
their import for judicial construction of relevant legal rules-how, in other
words, the kinds of problems environmental law seeks to address may warrant
special consideration in the Court's decisions.
The Court's decisions in Tennessee Valley Authority,"'6 City of Chicago
v. Environmental Defense Fund,'7 and Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Com-
munities for a Great Oregonss all represent significant, albeit rare, victories
for environmental concerns in the Supreme Court. In none of those
rulings, however, do those concerns play an explicit positive role, if any, in
the Court's analysis. 9
184. See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 509, 509-10 (1974); James L. Oakes, Substantive Judicial Review in Environmental Law,
[1977] 7 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,029, 50,030 (Jan.-Dec. 1977); see also Robert Glicksman
& Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 249, 261-64.
185. See J. William Futrell, The Ungreening of the Court, ENVTL. F., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 12, 16
("The current Court's silence on the importance of ecological protection ... stands in sharp con-
trast with Supreme Court opinions of the 1970s, which featured forthright declarations in support
of the national environmental goals enunciated by Congress.").
186. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
187. 511 U.S. 328 (1994).
188. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
189. The singling out of these three cases is not intended to suggest that they are the only
significant environmental victories during the past three decades. There are most certainly oth-
ers. See, e.g., PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 723 (1994) (upholding
state authority under the Clean Water Act to impose instream flow requirements on federally
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Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion in Tennessee Valley
Authority (the snail darter case). 9' While the Court upheld the environ-
mental position favoring protection of the snail darter, the Chief Justice's
opinion seems somewhat skeptical of the very result that it upholds, sug-
gesting that the statutory language has compelled the Court to endorse such
a result, notwithstanding what the Court might believe to be "common
sense and the public weal...... Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in City
of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund192 contains no such harsh rhetoric,
but neither does he acknowledge the possible relevancy of the environ-
mental context and then discuss why the Court should avoid endorsing
agency constructions of statutes, such as environmental protection laws, that
create broad exceptions in the absence of strong evidence of congressional
intent that supports the agency's view. Finally, even Justice Stevens, writ-
ing for the Court in Sweet Home, never relates the environmental context
to the Court's rationale. The majority's rationale is devoid of any suggestion
that its environmental context---e.g., the irreversibility of species extinction or
the teachings of conservation biology-was even relevant to the legal analysis.
Imagine, however, if Justice Douglas were on the Court and writing
any of the Court's opinions in those three cases. The Court's rhetoric regard-
ing environmental protection and its legal relevance would have been far
different. Recall his genuine passion dissenting in Sierra Club v. Morton in
favor of expansive notions of legal standing:
Those who hike the Appalachian Trail into Sunfish Pond, New Jer-
sey, and camp or sleep there, or run the Allagash in Maine, or climb
the Guadalupes in West Texas, or who canoe and portage the Quetico
Superior in Minnesota, certainly should have standing to defend
those natural wonders before courts or agencies, though they live
3,000 miles away. Those who merely are caught up in environmental
news or propaganda and flock to defend these waters or areas may be
treated differently. That is why these environmental issues should be
tendered by the inanimate object itself. Then there will be assurances
that all of the forms of life which it represents will stand before the
court-the pileated woodpecker as well as the coyote and bear,
the lemmings as well as the trout in the streams. Those inarticulate
licensed hydroelectric facilities); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
126-29 (1985) (upholding an expansive construction of the jurisdictional scope of the Clean Water
Act). The three cases discussed in the text are merely illustrative.
190. See 437 U.S. at 156.
191. Id. at 195; see id. at 194 ("Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular
course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute.").
192. 511 U.S. 328.
193. Cf. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116,
135 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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members of the ecological group cannot speak. But those people
who have so frequented the place as to know its values and wonders
will be able to speak for the entire ecological community."
Or consider Justice Black's emotional dissent in Named Individual Members
of the San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department:'95
The cars will spew forth air and noise pollution contaminating those
acres not buried under concrete. Mothers will grow anxious and
desert the park lest their children be crushed beneath the massive
wheels of interstate trucks. [Environmental] legislation has come about
in response to aroused citizens who have awakened to the impor-
tance of a decent environment for our Nation's well-being and our
very survival.'96
Such emotion has meaning when it comes from the Court. It sends an
influential message to the lower courts and to the public at large. Rigorous,
sound legal reasoning need not be devoid of passion or the power of moral
suasion to be legitimate or to be effective.
Today, however, the only passionate rhetorical flourishes evident in
environmental cases are those penned by Justice Scalia. And they do not
trumpet the importance of environmental protection; they question it.' 97
Indeed, apart from those flourishes that strive to disparage or question the
efficacy of environmental law, the environment itself seems to have been
excised from environmental law.
For most of the Court most of the time environmental law raises no
special issues or concerns worthy of distinct treatment as a substantive area
194. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 751-52 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
195. 400 U.S. 968 (1970).
196. Id. at 969-71.
197. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515
U.S. 687, 714 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's holding that the hunting and killing
prohibition incidentally preserves habitat on private lands imposes unfairness to the point of finan-
cial ruin-not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to
national zoological use."); id. at 734 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
For surely the only harm to the individual animal from impairment of that "essential
function" is not the failure of issue (which harms only the issue), but the psychic harm of
perceiving that it will leave this world with no issue (assuming, of course, that the animal
in question, perhaps an endangered species of slug, is capable of such painful sentiments).
Id.; see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992) ("Since
such a justification can be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether
the legislature has a stupid staff. We think the Takings Clause requires courts to do more than
insist upon artful harm-preventing characterizations."); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
566 (1992) ("Respondents' other theories are called, alas, the 'animal nexus' approach, whereby
anyone who has an interest in studying or seeing the endangered animals anywhere on the globe has
standing; and the 'vocational nexus' approach, under which anyone with a professional interest in
such animals can sue."); id. at 567 n.3 ("We decline to join Justice Stevens in this Linnaean leap.").
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of law. Environmental protection is merely an incidental context for resolution
of a legal question: of administrative law in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC"9'
and City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund;99 First Amendment law in
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego;2° Fourth Amendment law in Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States"' and United States v. Ward;. 2 criminal law in
United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp. ;23 corporation law
in United States v. Bestfoods;. 4 and bankruptcy law in Ohio v. Kovacs. 5
Remarkably illustrative is Justice White's decision, previously described,"6
to side with the EPA in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n, °7 and to uphold the
validity of variances for technology-based standards otherwise applicable to
discharges of toxic effluent. 8 White stressed in his note to Marshall that
resolution of the case did not make much difference to administrative law
one way or the other.2 9
To a certain extent, Justice White's intuition is no doubt correct.
Environmental law does not exist in a vacuum. Environmental issues do arise
in contexts that implicate other, very important crosscutting areas of law,
such as administrative law, corporate law, Tenth Amendment law, Fifth
Amendment law, and criminal law. The Court, moreover, must strive in
specific cases, including environmental law cases, for consistency in the
Court's treatment of those broader issues. At least as a general matter, the
Court should not assume that certain basic questions of administrative law,
corporate law, criminal law, or other comparable areas of law have one answer
in the environmental context and a different answer in another. Indeed, the
Court might fairly presume just the opposite: There is one consistent answer
applicable to all contexts within which these crosscutting issues arise.
But the Court's intuition in general (and Justice White's in the Chemi-
cal Manufacturers Ass'n case, in particular) still falls short. Environmental
protection may nonetheless legitimately inform the Court's consideration of
crosscutting issues, whether arising within the context of administrative law
or any other, and they may sometimes justify striking a new and different
balance in their resolution. Environmental protection concerns need not
198. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
199. 511 U.S. 328 (1994).
200. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
201. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
202. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
203. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
204. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
205. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
206. See supra text accompanying note 25.
207. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
208. See id. at 134.
209. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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always be a dispositive factor to be legitimately so in some instances, and
otherwise to be at least a relevant, weighty factor.
The nation's commitment to enhanced environmental protection has
served in many lower courts, as it has in the executive and legislative
branches, a very positive and appropriate role in evolving many broadly
applicable areas of law relevant to the fashioning of legal rules for environ-
mental protection. Administrative law has evolved. So too has tort law,
corporate law, bankruptcy law, and criminal law. Indeed, one could fairly
posit that hardly any area of law has been untouched by environmental
law's emergence during the past thirty years. Environmental law is not, there-
fore, simply an isolated series of formal legislative enactments and administra-
tive regulations. Those enactments and regulations are just the most formal
expressions of a field of law that is far more sweeping in its impact on the
legal landscape.
The explanation for environmental law's simultaneously wide and deep
reach lies in the way that legal rules reflect balances struck between competing
concerns. When the public starts to place greater value on one concern, such
as environmental protection, the public's doing so may warrant law reforms
of differing orders of magnitude. Sometimes it may warrant a restriking of
balances underlying a host of legal rules in a variety of areas. This would
occur, for instance, when the environmental dimension of a case illuminates
a general doctrinal failing. An entire area of law is, accordingly, rethought.
On other occasions, however, it may be only the legal doctrine's appli-
cation in the environmental context that requires more careful, and differ-
ent, consideration. This could occur when the pre-existing doctrinal solution
has reflected a balancing of competing values. The balance struck may differ
in light of the special weight the environmental context suggests should be
given to particular ecological values.
Somewhat ironically in light of Justice White's deliberations in Chemical
Manufacturers Ass'n," ° one of the best-documented examples of law reform
at environmental law's instigation has been the reformation of administra-
tive law that occurred during the 1970s. Change occurred quite often at the
instigation of environmental law. But the resulting administrative law frame-
work was not confined in its application to environmental law per se."
210. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
211. Environmental issues helped to trigger widely ranging innovations in administrative
law such as the "hard look" doctrine, hybrid rule making, expansive opportunities for public par-
ticipation in the administrative process, and liberalized standing rules for challenges to administra-
tive agency decisions. See Leventhal, supra note 184, at 514; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1715-16 (1975); see also FREDERICK R.
ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 83 (2d ed. 1990) (dis-
cussing the substantial alteration of administrative law in response to environmental litigation
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Justice Marshall's dissent in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n 212 illustrates
the proper use of environmental concerns in legal analysis of an issue of
administrative law. It also underscores what was missing from the major-
ity's analysis in that case. Unlike the majority, the dissent apprehends the
relevancy for statutory interpretation of the possibility of "small errors"
leading to "irreversible or catastrophic results"-a typical feature in envi-
ronmental problems.213 The dissent likewise expressly acknowledges the
relevancy for the judicial interpretive function of the fact that because
"[e]nvironmental problems often present thresholds," "the cost of a relatively
small mistake is very high.,
214
Not surprisingly, however, it is Justice Douglas who was most apt to
apprehend how environmental protection concerns can warrant thinking
differently about crosscutting legal issues. His dissents from the Court's rul-
ings in two 1973 cases, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District215 and Associated Enterprises v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District,"6
are illustrative. The Court ruled in those cases that equal protection was not
violated by a state statute that excluded tenants and permitted only land-
owners to vote for candidates for the water storage district and weighed their
votes according to the value of the land each owned.2"7 To many, these
would appear to be fairly rarified cases, bearing at most only a tangential
relationship to environmental law. But that is also precisely why the cases
illustrate so well how a fuller appreciation of the environmental dimension
of a case may affect the Court's resolution of a legal dispute seemingly unre-
lated to environmental law.
Justice Douglas understood the environmental connection. He per-
ceived the issues differently from the majority in each case precisely because
he understood the role that water played in the lives and ecosystem of the
affected tenants:
It is also inconceivable that a body with the power to destroy a river
by damming it and so deprive a watershed of one of its most salient
environmental assets does not have 'sufficient impact' on the inter-
during the 1970s); Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Envi-
ronmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2415-16 (1995).
212. 470 U.S. at 134 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
213. See id. at 159 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 159 n.19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Environmental problems often present
thresholds. For example, if the level of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) in a river exceeds a
certain level, fish life will become impossible. A slightly lower BOD level, however, would prevent
this result. Thus, the cost of a relatively small mistake is very high." (citing BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 265-66 (1974))).
215. 410 U.S. 719, 735 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
216. 410 U.S. 743, 745 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
217. See Associated Enters., 410 U.S. at 744-45; Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 733.
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ests of people generally to invoke the principles of Avery [v. Midland
County218] and Hadley [v. Junior College District9 ].
220
Douglas, accordingly, referred to the "enormity of the violation of our envi-
ronmental ethics. '2 2' Regardless of whether one shares Douglas's ultimate
view on the merits,222 his analysis correctly appreciates the environmental
dimension of considering the voting rights issue before the Court.
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in Dolan v. City of Tigard223 likewise
demonstrates how an understanding of the nature of environmental problems
is relevant to legal analysis, but in a far more contemporary setting. In Dolan,
Stevens stresses why government needs to be given more latitude when it is
imposing restrictions to guard against environmental risks that are not fully
understood:
In our changing world one thing is certain: uncertainty will char-
acterize predictions about the impact of new urban developments on
the risks of floods, earthquakes, traffic congestion, or environmental
harms. When there is doubt concerning the magnitude of those
impacts, the public interest in averting them must outweigh the pri-
vate interest of the commercial entrepreneur.
224
Notwithstanding these isolated exceptions, the trend since the 1970s
has quite plainly been towards the Justices' showing little, if any, recogni-
tion of the environmental dimension of environmental law. The Justices
simply do not perceive environmental law beyond its expression in some
formal statutory enactments and its presentation of yet another incidental
context for their resolution of what are the truly significant crosscutting
issues of law and lawmaking processes. They lack any special appreciation
or caring for the ends environmental law seeks to accomplish or for the
challenges for lawmaking institutions and processes presented by the prob-
lems addressed by environmental law. For that same reason, the Justices
have systematically lacked the broader vision necessary to decide how envi-
ronmental concerns might either affect the Justices' resolution of a crosscutting
218. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
219. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
220. Associated Enters., 410 U.S. at 749.
221. Id. at 751.
222. The Court has since read its rulings in these two cases narrowly and, arguably,
restricted their reach at least with regard to land ownership and voting rights. See, e.g., Quinn v.
Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1989).
223. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
224. Id. at 411 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens's majority opinion for the Court in
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989), however, reflects less special
solicitude for this feature of environmental protection law. See supra notes 69-89 and accompa-
nying text.
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legal issue raised in a specific environmental context or even warrant a gen-
erally applicable evolution in the Court's own thinking about the issue.
The upshot has been, in effect, a stripping of what is truly environ-
mental about environmental law from the Court's analysis. The cost is sub-
stantial. The Court fails to consider the sheer importance of environmental
protection to the issues before the Court. Even more fundamentally, the
Court deprives itself of the opportunity to consider how the special challenges
environmental protection presents may warrant evolution in legal doctrine
in a host of relevant areas of law.
III. RESTORING WHAT'S ENVIRONMENTAL ABOUT
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
There are three logical steps to restoring what is environmental about
environmental law in the Supreme Court. The first, of course, is to identify
the features of environmental conflicts that present special challenges for
their resolution. The prior analysis suggests several of these features, which
are outlined more fully below.
The second step is to relate each of these basic features of environ-
mental conflicts to the development of a legal regime. How do they present
challenges to certain areas of law? How do they present challenges to cer-
tain lawmaking institutions and processes? These challenges are the source
of the crosscutting legal issues that have been the inevitable incident of
environmental law's emergence during the past three decades.
The third step is to persuade the Justices that they have paid too little
attention to these challenges in the Court's resolution of the crosscutting legal
issues. The first two steps are more abstract, theoretical undertakings. The
last is more strategic in character. It involves consideration of how, in light
of the severe structural limitations placed on any effort to obtain attitudinal
shifts in the Justices, that objective might nonetheless be accomplished for
environmental law. Each of the three steps is described in more detail
below.
A. What Is Environmental About Environmental Law-The Nature
of Environmental Injury
What makes environmental law distinctive is largely traceable to the
nature of the injury that environmental protection law seeks to reduce, mini-
mize, or sometimes prevent altogether. Environmental law is concerned, in
the first instance, with impacts on the natural environment. Hence, although
some environmental laws are concerned about human health effects, as are
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many other types of laws (e.g., food and drug, worker safety, Medicare, and
food stamp programs), environmental law is concerned only about human
health effects resulting from impacts on the natural environment. And, of
course, many environmental laws are concerned only with those impacts
and not with possible human health effects at all.
A common denominator, therefore, for environmental law is the ecological
injury that serves as the law's threshold and often exclusive focus. That com-
mon denominator is also the primary source of the special challenges environ-
mental law presents for lawmaking. Ecological injury has several recurring
features that render its redress through law especially difficult. These pertain
to both the "cause" and the "effect" of such injury, each of which inevitably
becomes a regulatory touchstone in any legal regime for environmental
protection. Some of the more obvious features are discussed below.
1. Irreversible, Catastrophic, and Continuing Injury: Environmental law
is often concerned about the avoidance of irreversible, catastrophic results.
The destruction of an aquifer upon which a community depends for drink-
ing water, the erosion of soil necessary for farming that required centuries
to develop, and the destruction of the ozone layer are not possibilities to be
lightly taken. Such potential downsides render enormously costly any
errors in decision making. Yet, while errors are costly, so too can be delays
in decision making. Even the best resolution is worth little if it is developed
too late to prevent a chain of events inexorably leading to ecological disaster.
Finally, a closely related trait of some environmental injury is its con-
tinuing nature. Environmental law must address harm that increases over
time. The harm is dynamic and not static in character. An oil spill addressed
quickly may be confined to manageable dimensions. But conversely, if not
quickly addressed, it may rapidly and exponentially increase in scope to over-
whelming dimensions. Legal regimes that are inherently cautious and slow to
react do not readily lend themselves to the quick action often necessary in the
ecological context.
2. Physically Distant Injury: Ecological injury is often not physically
confineable. Actions in one location may have substantial adverse effects in
very distant locations. This may be because the pollutants actually travel
from one place to another. Or it may be as the result of the adverse impacts
of activities in one locale on a global commons, upon the viability of which
many regions are dependent.
Long-range transportation of airborne pollutants is an example of
the former."' The ozone layer in the upper atmosphere exemplifies the
225. See generally MARVIN S. SOROOS, THE ENDANGERED ATMOSPHERE: PRESERVING A
GLOBAL COMMONS 38-42 (1997).
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transboundary implications of degradation of a commons resource, as the
destruction of the ozone layer by activities in one part of the world can have
serious environmental and human health effects in other parts of the world. 26
Global warming presents a similar physical dimension.227
For each, the associated challenges for the establishment of any legal
regime are great, especially because the costs of control are imposed in one
area and the benefits are enjoyed in a very different area. Such a distribu-
tional mismatch renders the adoption, implementation, and enforcement of
the necessary transboundary legal rules very difficult. 28 This is certainly true
in the international arenas, but even far more localized spreadings of causes
and effects between states and counties resist ready political resolutions.
3. Temporally Distant Injury: Much of the injury environmental law
seeks to address is not imminent. Sometimes actions now may trigger the
injury, but the injury itself will be realized only in the distant future. Some-
times the injury will be realized now and will increase, inexorably, over
time. To the extent that the latter is occurring, this temporal character to
some environmental injury may become, as a practical matter, irreversible
and thus collapse into the first feature of ecological injury described above.2
This temporal feature of ecological injuries poses challenges to legal
doctrine and lawmaking analogous to those presented by the "physically
distant" characteristic discussed above. The same distributional mismatch is
presented but even more problematically, because the benefits to be enjoyed
will generally inure only to future generations lacking any representation in
226. See generally EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY 641-48 (1998).
227. See id. at 679-90.
228. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931,
932,968-71 (1997).
229. The traditional notion of a present/future dichotomy in environmental law is persua-
sively challenged by Lisa Heinzerling, who demonstrates
that, in reality, the beneficial consequences of environmental regulation do not occur
within a single time frame, either the present or the future, one to the exclusion of the
other.... [Tihe good human consequences of environmental law-ranging from reduc-
ing risk to preventing disease to forestalling death-are arrayed along a continuum
stretching from the immediate present to the distant future.
Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2026 (1999).
Heinzerling further describes how "the present and the future are as much interactive as they are
sequential, and their interaction works in both directions: the future reaches into the present, and
the present into the future." Id. An example of the former is current anxiety (including associ-
ated human health consequences about future harm); the latter is represented by the long interval
between exposure to a hazardous substance and the clinical manifestation of the disease. See id. at
2026-27. That cause and effect in environmental law cannot, however, be accurately described
by a straightforward present/future dichotomy does not eliminate the challenges presented by
ecological injury's temporal feature to environmental lawmaking, which is this Article's inquiry. The
more sophisticated description of that temporal feature instead increases the related challenges.
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current lawmaking fora. Such intergenerational effects raise issues regarding
the propriety of "discounting" the value of future benefits (including human
lives) in selecting environmental controls today. 3 Even more fundamen-
tally, however, the intergenerational dimension to ecological injury raises
basic questions regarding the moral responsibilities that current generations
have to safeguard the interests of future generations.'
4. Uncertainty and Risk: There is much uncertainty associated with
environmental injury, which poses even further challenges for lawmaking.232
The primary source of this uncertainty is the sheer complexity of the natural
environment and, accordingly, how much is still unknown about it. This
uncertainty expresses itself in our inability to know beforehand the envi-
ronmental impact of certain actions. It equally undermines our ability to
apprehend, after the fact, what precisely caused certain environmental
impacts.
The inevitable upshot is that environmental laws that seek to prevent
harm are directed to risk rather than to actual impact. It similarly means
that environmental laws that seek to assign responsibility for harm that has
already occurred are limited in their ability to do so.
Because, moreover, environmental law is concerned with risk, there is
an inherently psychological dimension to the injury being redressed. The
injury is not confined to that which occurs if the risk is itself realized. There
is often psychological harm resulting from the risk itself, whether or not
ever realized. For this same reason, by failing to address that mental
dimension, one can increase the associated injury even if the numerical
probability of the risk's physical realization remains the same.
5. Multiple Causes: Ecological injuries are rarely the product of a single
action at an isolated moment of time. Putting aside the pervasive uncer-
tainty issues, environmental harms are more typically the cumulative and
synergistic result of multiple actions, often spread over significant time and
space. This is primarily traceable to the sharing inherent in any common
natural resource base, which is the object of so many simultaneous and spo-
radic actions over time and space.
230. See id. at 2069-74; see also Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 39, 39-40 (1999). But see John J. Donohue I1, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those
Who Discount Discounting, 108 YALE L.J. 1901, 1903 (1999) (responded to in Lisa Heinzerling,
Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911 (1999)).
231. See Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity,
11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495, 499-502 (1984). See generally EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO
FUTURE GENERATIONS (1989).
232. See Howard A. Latin, The "Significance" of Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal Deci-
sionmaking Under Uncertainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339, 339-40 (1982).
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6. Noneconomic, Nonhuman Character: Many of the ecological injuries
resulting from environmental degradation are not readily susceptible to mone-
tary valuation and have a distinctively nonhuman character. There is simply
no readily available market analogue. The nonexclusive nature of the natural
resources at stake is often one factor prompting resistance of valuation. Even
more generally, the decision to protect the ecological interest in question may
have been deliberately made notwithstanding any notion of economic value.
It could, of course, be ultimately rooted in notions of uncertainty and concerns
about adverse human health affects-e.g., the after-the-fact discovery that the
DNA of a subspecies of fly would have cured the common cold. But it may
instead be, and often is, based on the deeper notion that there are certain
results-such as species extinction or resource destruction-that humankind
should strive to avoid because they fall beyond its legitimate authority. 33
Other kinds of injury that resist ready monetary valuation are the
adverse human health effects that can result from environmental degrada-
tion, although these valuation issues are shared by all laws designed to safe-
guard human health. For some economists, all human health effects of this
kind must be susceptible to such valuation for the simple reason that
tradeoffs are inevitably made in any allocation of limited societal resources.
Nothing has infinite value, and each decision has opportunity costs related
to opportunities thereby foregone. But some environmental laws reflect a
very different philosophy, which posits that there are some adverse human
health effects that are presumptively out of bounds for policymakers. For
those who share that policy view, economic valuation and tradeoffs are
therefore not legitimate topics for policy discussion.
Perhaps, moreover, it is this normative dimension of ecological injury that
is ultimately the most telling. The environmental dimension of environmental
law teaches that the nonhuman, nonmonetizable dimensions of ecological
injury not only exist but are worth protecting. They reflect positive values
that are entitled to weight in the balancing in which members of the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches are ultimately engaged as part of
their respective lawmaking and policymaking responsibilities.
B. Challenges for Law and Lawmaking
Because of these varied features of ecological injuries, the challenges of
constructing a legal regime for environmental protection are considerable.
233. See FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND
POLICY 1 (3d ed. 1999) ("[Ihe primary thrust of environmentalism is not the enhancement of
human dignity, but the need for humankind to subordinate itself to two communities with no
legal personality, one human-future generations-and the other nonhuman-ecosystems.").
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Some of the challenges affect substantive areas of law. Others pertain more
to the process of lawmaking and the related institutions than to any distinct
area of law. In certain circumstances, a full appreciation of the associated
challenges may well justify a modification of current law or the functioning
of certain lawmaking institutions, but confined to the environmental context.
In other circumstances, however, the lessons to be learned from environmental
law may have more far-reaching import. They may suggest that an entire area
of law, or the ways in which particular lawmaking institutions operate,
should be rethought.
1. Legal Doctrine
The number of areas of law crosscutting with environmental law is so
great and far-flung that an exhaustive discussion cannot be undertaken here.
The four areas discussed briefly below-Article III standing, property, dormant
commerce clause, and corporate law-are simply illustrative. Similar narra-
tives could be drafted regarding many other crosscutting areas of law,3 such
2126231 218as bankruptcy law,235 civil rights law,3  criminal law, insurance, reme-
dies,239 securities,2 ° or tort law.41
Article III Standing: The law of standing is one obvious legal doctrine
for which the nature of ecological injury is peculiarly relevant. Standing law
is concerned with the existence of an "injury" in the first instance, with the
action of the defendant's being a "cause" of that injury, and with the injury's
234. See generally Lazarus, supra note 211.
235. See generally Arlene Elgart Mirsky et al., The Interface Between Bankruptcy and Envi-
ronmental Laws, 22 CHEMICAL WASTE LITIG. REP. 311 (1991); Douglas P. DeMoss, Note, The
Bankruptcy Code and Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of the Policy Conflict, 27 WM. &
MARYL. REV. 165 (1985).
236. See generally Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots
Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV.
775 (1998); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Envi-
ronmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787 (1993).
237. See generally Lazarus, supra note 211.
238. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942 (1988).
239. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental
Injunctions, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 513 (1984); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable
Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REV. 524 (1982).
240. See generally Perry E. Wallace, Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities Under the Securities
Laws: The Potential of Securities-Market-Based Incentives for Pollution Control, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1093 (1993); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999).
241. See generally Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1(1993).
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susceptibility to "redress" through the lawsuit.242 The special features presented
by ecological injury speak to each of these three inquiries (injury, cause, and
redress).
The Court's treatment of standing in environmental cases, however,
reveals little appreciation (or responsiveness) to the nature of ecological
injury. To be sure, the Court initially expanded injury cognizable for stand-
ing to include the kind of ecological, aesthetic harms frequently at issue in
environmental cases."' The Court likewise took some account of the
inevitably uncertain and speculative nature of such injuries, in particular,
the more attenuated chains of causation between action and injury.44
More recently, however, the Court has decidedly retreated from some
of its original responsiveness.145 The Court has taken principles of standing
law, typically first announced in other legal contexts,4  and then rigidly
applied them to the environmental context. Virtually no effort has been made
to consider how certain features of ecological injuries, such as uncertain and
attenuated chains of causation, noneconomic character, and unrepresented
future generations, render their rigid application inappropriate. Until very
recently,247 the trend in the Court's rulings has been so plain and dispropor-
tionately prejudicial to environmental concerns that Justice Blackmun
questioned openly in dissent why the Court was so systematically disfavor-
ing environmental plaintiffs in the law of standing.24
242. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-74 (1982).
243. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
244. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 686-88 (1973).
245. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102-04 (1998); Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,
882-89 (1990).
246. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
247. Just as this Article was going to final press, the Supreme Court decided Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., No. 98-822, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 501 (U.S. Jan. 12,
2000). The Court in Friends of the Earth dramatically rejected mootness and standing defenses
raised by industry in a citizen suit brought by Friends of the Earth pursuant to the federal Clean
Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566. The Court's ruling marks a significant retreat
from some of the broader implications in the Court's recent standing precedent, adverse to environ-
mental citizen suit plaintiffs, discussed in this Article's text. The Court's having done so, however,
does not detract from the Article's ultimate thesis. The favorable result obtained in Friends of the
Earth was the product of the very kind of coordinated, strategic litigation effort on behalf of
environmental protection concerns that this Article advocates. See infra note 328.
248. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I cannot join the Court on
what amounts to a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of environmental standing."). See
generally JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA & JON T. ZEIDLER, BARELY STANDING: THE EROSION OF CITIZEN
"STANDING" TO SUE TO ENFORCE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Georgetown University Law
Ctr. Envtl. Policy Project 1999).
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For example, the Court requires that a plaintiff alleging injury to the
natural environment, such as a wildlife species, possess some particularized
professional or direct physical relation to the species at issue."' The Court
thus too swiftly denies the legitimacy of the very psychological and emotional
tie to aspects of the natural environment that Congress sought to legitimize
by enacting the Endangered Species Act and its citizen suit provision."'
The Court's causation inquiry similarly fails to account for the nature
of ecological injury. Prompted by the Court's recent precedent denying
environmental citizen suit standing, many lower courts are refusing to accom-
modate the uncertain nature of the causal chains associated with much
ecological injury. They are demanding that plaintiffs establish more than a
violation of allowable discharges; they must further allege and prove that
those violations will cause certain adverse effects on the environment and
that those effects will cause some particularized harm to the plaintiffs. 5'
Such showings are not only extremely difficult because of scientific uncer-
tainty and ecological complexity, but they further contradict the statutory
scheme Congress established. In the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts, for
example, Congress deliberately decided that a statutory violation should not
require such a showing of an actual ecological impact. Congress did so pre-
cisely because of the massive difficulty of such a showing and Congress's con-
comitant policy determination to guard against risk qua risk. By nonetheless
demanding that a plaintiff show such injury to possess standing, a court both
ignores the nature of ecological injury and, by frustrating congressional pol-
icy, potentially raises another set of separation of powers concerns."'
Similar tensions arise from other aspects of the Supreme Court's recent
efforts to reinvigorate the law of standing. The Court's test for "imminence"
is difficult to apply in environmental cases in which the ecological injury at
249. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-67.
250. In enacting the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Congress plainly was not simply
responding to the narrow category of concerns represented by those very few individuals who
might have actual, immediate plans to travel to the precise location where the species is located
and interact there with individual members. Congress instead was responding to the broader
category of persons who care deeply about the survival of those species for any of a number of rea-
sons, ranging from scientific interest to deeply held views of the responsibilities of humankind to
other species. Such a concrete, individualized concern need not be based on the party's having
the personal resources necessary for actual travel and some sort of a physical communing with the
species. By its terms, moreover, the ESA explicitly authorizes persons to initiate citizen suits
against those in violation of the statute, without statutorily restricting in any manner the precise
nature of the concrete injury required for Article III standing. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
251. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d 107, 113
(4th Cir. 1999); Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111,
119-25 (3d Cir. 1997); Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 666-72 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
252. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Causation in Government Regulation and Toxic Torts, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 1307, 1336 (1998).
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issue is long-term in nature.5 So too problems arise in applying the Court's
stricter notions of "redressability. ''254 If, as often occurs with ecological injury,
there is not a single action and impact, but a chain of interrelated actors and
actions, it can be quite speculative to posit that relief against any one of sev-
eral responsible causes is likely to secure the required redress.
Property Law: The nature of ecological injuries also creates considerable
pressure for change in property law doctrine. Restrictions designed to address
ecological injuries invariably limit the exercise of private property rights in
253. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564. The Court has recently described the requirement that the
injury be "imminent" as meaning that the injury be "certainly impending," see id. at 565 n.2 (citing
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)), and has further posited that in some circum-
stances "we have insisted that the injury proceed with a high degree of immediacy, so as to reduce
the possibility of deciding a case in which no injury would have occurred at all." 504 U.S. at 565
n.2. As described previously, see supra text accompanying notes 234-253, ecological injuries
frequently tend to possess neither that level of certainty in their occurrence nor the temporal
immediacy that the Court appears to be suggesting may be constitutionally mandated by Article
III for an aggrieved plaintiff to have standing in federal court.
254. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568-71. The Court describes the redressability element as man-
dating that "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed
by a favorable decision."' Id. at 561 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 38, 43 (1976)). Because, however, ecological injury frequently is not traceable to just one
actor, but results from the cumulative effects of multiple actors subject to overlapping regulatory
jurisdictions, a rigorous showing of redressability is not so simply demonstrable. Most recently,
moreover, the Court's unduly rigid application of the redressability element of standing in cases
such as Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), is prompting further
arguments to the Court that Congress's entire scheme for citizen suit enforcement of environ-
mental law is unconstitutional because it fails to satisfy redressability requirements (because fines
received go to the U.S. Treasury and not to the citizen plaintiffs). See Amicus Brief for California
Ass'n of Sanitation Agencies at 12-16, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., No. 98-822, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 501 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2000). In its recent ruling in Friends of the
Earth, the Court declined the invitation of amicus to consider the threshold issue of the constitu-
tionality of citizen suits, presumably because the issue had not been raised in or decided by the
lower courts in that case; nor had the parties raised it before the Supreme Court. Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion in Friends of the Earth, joined by Justice Thomas does, however, reflect such
constitutional concerns. See id. at *65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The new standing law that the
Court makes-like all expansions of standing beyond the traditional constitutional limits-has
grave implications for democratic governance."). But even more significantly, although Justice
Kennedy joined the Friends of the Earth majority opinion, he also wrote separately for the sole pur-
pose of acknowledging that
[dlifficult and fundamental questions are raised when we ask whether exactions of public
fines by private litigants, and the delegation of Executive power which might be infer-
able from the authorization, are permissible in view of the responsibilities committed to
the Executive by Article II of the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at *56 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy concluded that the issues would be "best
reserved for a later case" because "[tihe questions presented in the petition for certiorari did not
identify these issues with particularity; and neither the Court of Appeals in deciding the case nor
the parties in their briefing before this Court devoted specific attention to the subject." Id. at
*56-*57 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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natural resources 55 These limitations disrupt, sometimes severely, settled eco-
nomic expectations in those resources. The distributional repercussions are
considerable, and they fuel major conflicts in various political arenas regarding
how private property rights in natural resources should be defined and
protected."6 In extreme circumstances, moreover, those on the losing end of
the policy determinations file lawsuits challenging any resulting limitations
on their exercise of property rights as unconstitutional Fifth Amendment
takings of private property requiring the payment of just compensation.25 7
The associated controversy for property rights is exacerbated because
of the uncertain nature of the ecological injury that serves as the basis for
environmental restrictions. Such uncertainty makes it difficult in either a
political or a judicial arena for the restrictions' proponents to establish their
necessity."' Especially because of the need to avoid irreversible and cata-
strophic results, the restrictions need to be imposed before one can be con-
fident of their necessity or efficacy.
In addition, precisely because the restrictions are based on uncertain
information in the first instance, they often change over time. Initial experi-
mental environmental regulatory programs are constantly revised in light of
new information, as they should be, which is why environmental law has been
so dynamic during the past thirty years.2"9 But, what may represent a sound
dynamic process for lawmaking can nonetheless even further undermine
investments by private parties made in reliance on certain environmental
restrictions' remaining in place.
In addressing the regulatory takings issue, however, the Justices have
maintained assumptions that fly squarely in the face of the kind of ecological
injuries that Congress and various state and local legislatures seek to address.
For example, in Lucas, in which a landowner brought a Fifth Amendment
255. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 239, 241-43 (1990);
David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial Protection of the Public's
Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 311, 312-13 (1988).
256. See infra text accompanying notes 319-323.
257. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 729-33 (1997); Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007-10 (1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1987).
258. Justice Stevens's dissent in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), comments on this very issue. See supra text accompanying notes 223-224.
259. See RODGERS, supra note 108, § 1.2, at 25 (noting that the environmental law field is
marked by "dynamics and flux where a regulation is inseparable from a revision, a statute not far
from an amendment"); Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791, 791 (1994) (noting that in environmental law "every solution seems pro-
visional and subject to reevaluation as new information appears and old solutions are tested against
experience"); see also Daniel P. Selmi, Experimentation and the "New" Environmental Law, 27 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 1061, 1076 (1994) (advocating the need for further experimentation and funda-
mental change in the nature of environmental law).
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regulatory takings challenge to a South Carolina law that prevented resi-
dential development of his coastal property, the Court's regulatory takings
analysis rested, at bottom, on a fundamental misapprehension of the nature
of land 6.2 " The Lucas majority perceived land as a discrete, severable resource,
which is why the Court found utterly implausible the notion that South
Carolina might have a reason, analogous to a traditional nuisance rationale,
for preventing the construction of a home on land. What the majority lacked
was any appreciation of the true physical nature of land and the associated
nature of injuries to a complex, interdependent ecological system of which
land is a part.
The facts of Lucas itself are illustrative. The land at issue was immedi-
ately adjacent to the shore, with no natural barriers separating the ocean from
the location of the residences proposed for development. Indeed, much of
the property was composed substantially of water rather than what most
would consider land. The properties were subject to the daily action of the
tide and, in the past, had been partially (and sometimes entirely) covered
by water. During the past fifty years, the shoreline had itself been landward
of the landowner's property 50 percent of the time because of the competing
forces of accretion and erosion. Absent any meaningful understanding of
the actual physical nature of the ecological resource, the injuries possibly
resulting from its development, and, therefore, the state legislature's possible
justifications for its action, the Lucas majority too quickly perceived the
case as one presenting an extraordinarily harsh instance of governmental
abuse of police power authority.261
The Justices rely, moreover, on tests of "economic viability" and "eco-
nomic loss" that, at bottom, depend for their validity on the operation of the
very market that the legislature is saying does not provide a fair measure of the
property rights at issue.262 The legislative premise of most environmental
restrictions is that property rights need to be redefined because the current
regime permits certain private actions that have unacceptably adverse effects
on others. Accepting the validity of that legislative premise, one would
anticipate that any diminutions in property value resulting from such
restrictions on use would signal the extent to which such a regulatory fix was,
in fact, necessary. In other words, the higher the prerestriction market value
of the property to be regulated, the greater the problem being addressed.
Yet the "economic viability" and "economic loss" inquiries presume
just the opposite. They see economic loss as a sign of legislative overreaching
260. See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
261. See Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1421-
22 (1993).
262. See 505 U.S. at 1014-19.
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rather than as a sign that the legislature was addressing a major problem of
market failure.263
As in the law of standing, the Court should not, of course, wholly defer
to the legislature's judgment any more than it should wholly ignore it. The
Court has an independent responsibility to ensure that important const-
itutional protections, such as those related to private property rights, are
safeguarded. But fulfillment of that responsibility does not justify the Justices'
paying no heed to the factual and public-policy premises underlying the
environmental legislation that serves as the backdrop to the Court's resolu-
tion of the legal issue before it. Just as Congress has sought to account for
the nature of ecological injury in establishing environmental protection
law, so too should the Court, both in discerning congressional intent and in
resolving crosscutting legal issues arising in the environmental context.
Dormant Commerce Clause: During the past two decades, the Court has
faced a series of cases involving dormant commerce clause challenges to state
environmental protection and resource conservation laws that seek to protect
the state's own environmental and economic interests from threats perceived
as originating from out-of-state sources. These include state laws concerned
about the importation of waste into the state from out-of-state sources.
They also include state laws concerned about the exportation of the state's
valuable natural resources.
With a few rare exceptions,2" the Court has routinely struck down
both state resource conservation and state pollution control laws as facially
discriminatory and, thus, per se violations of the negative implications of
the Commerce Clause.265 The Court's analysis of facially discriminatory laws,
263. The Court's regulatory takings analysis also relies on rigorous showings of proof of cau-
sation and redressability that, as in the case of standing law, are fundamentally at odds with the
nature of the injuries the legislature is seeking to address. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388-96.
264. One noted exception is the Court's ruling in Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52
(1986), sustaining the state of Maine's ban on the importation of baitfish. Indeed, Maine v. Taylor
represents one of the rare instances in which the Court's opinion expresses an appreciation for
how environmental concerns may influence the application of legal doctrine. One reason the
Court offered for sustaining Maine's importation ban was the legitimacy of the state's interest "in
guarding against imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the possibility that they may
ultimately prove to be negligible." Id. at 148. According to the Court, a state is not required to
"wait until potentially irreversible environmental damage has occurred." Id. (quoting United
States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. Me. 1984)). Another exception is Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 636-37 (1981), in which the Court upheld the const-
itutionality of a state severance tax on coal challenged on both Commerce Clause and federal
preemption grounds. Reflecting the strong temporal dimension of ecological injury, the Court in
Commonwealth Edison took explicit account of the state's desire to safeguard the interests of future
generations in the state's resource wealth, which the coal severance tax sought to accomplish by
creating a trust fund for future generations. See id. at 621 n. 11.
265. See, e.g., C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389-95 (1994);
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98-108 (1994); Fort
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such as those at issue in all these cases, is wholly unforgiving. To sustain any
facial discrimination against interstate products (including waste) or services,
the state government must proffer "some reason, apart from their origin, to treat
them differently.,
266
The Court's rulings, however, provide yet another classic instance in
which the Justices' failure to appreciate the special character of ecological
injuries undermines the Court's legal analysis. The Court irrebuttably pre-
sumes the illegitimacy of any consideration of the outsider status of the prod-
ucts or services at issue. Yet, in the environmental pollution context, "the
very concept of the 'risk' appropriate for regulatory treatment may depend on
the place in which a given risk originates., 267 As one commentator explains:
Several of the attributes that make laypeople fear some activities
or substances more than others (even if they pose the same statistical
risk of physical harm) are intertwined with outsider status .... The
likelihood of public opposition to a new waste disposal facility stems
in large part from the sense of "intrusion" a community feels on
account of the facility. The depth of this sense of intrusion depends
in part on the presence of coercion: where the community has no
opportunity to reject a proposed facility..., the community's per-
ception of risk, and its opposition to the facility, almost inevitably
will increase.26
Were the Justices to learn from the environmental context, they could
consider more carefully the nature of ecological injuries being redressed
by state laws in resolving dormant commerce clause challenges. They might
(or might not) reach a different result in those cases. But even if they did
not, their reasoning would be more thoughtful and the results they reached
would likely be more persuasive. Any resulting maturation of the Court's
Commerce Clause analysis, moreover, would not be confined simply to the
environmental context. It would apply broadly and potentially affect the
Court's decisions in wide-ranging circumstances.269
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 367-68
(1992); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 339-49 (1992); Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954-58 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325
(1979); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
266. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627 (emphasis added).
267. Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 217, 236.
268. Id. at 236-37. Nor is this "outsider" dimension to environmental law an incidental
matter. It is a driving concern in many of the claims of "environmental injustice," which both
federal and state regulators, as well as members of the regulated community, are increasingly hav-
ing to address. See generally Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and
the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1998).
269. See Heinzerling, supra note 267, at 239 ("The shortcomings of the Court's truncated
cost-benefit analysis are not limited to the environmental context.").
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Corporate Law: Corporate law offers one final example of an area of law
in which the Justices' legal analysis has been undermined by their disinclina-
tion to consider the distinct features of the kinds of problems environmental
law seeks to address. In a recent case, United States v. Bestfoods, zT° the Court
considered the liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)27' of a parent corpora-
tion for the actions of a subsidiary.272 For years, the various courts of appeals
sought, with conflicting results,7 to strike a balance between the values and
purposes of corporation law, which promotes severe limitations on parent
liability, and of environmental law, which seeks to impose costs on a broad
array of economic actors with the authority and capacity to make decisions
affecting the degree of environmental protection to be provided.
What was both striking and revealing about the oral argument before
the Court was that the Justices were uniformly aware and sympathetic to
the important policy objectives underlying corporate law's limited liability
rules; they were not, however, similarly aware of environmental law's com-
peting concerns supporting a more expansive liability net. Indeed, members
of the Court appeared completely shocked when informed of those principles
and their settled legal effect by government counsel at argument. 274  The
270. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
271. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
272. See 524 U.S. at 55.
273. See id. at 60 n.8, 63 n.9; Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and Operator Analysis
Under CERCLA: Finding Order in the Chaos of Pervasive Control, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 223, 225-26
(1994); Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV.
L. RaV. 986, 1001 (1986).
274. The following colloquy occurred during the government's opening presentation in the
Bestfoods oral argument:
QUESTION Dustice Breyer]: Look, I said Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their son, John,
do everything. They have a shovel. They put the dirt in. They do everything them-
selves. They are doing it through-they are paid-the checks are made out to the Smith
Family Limited Liability Corporation.
Now, I would think that that is the classic situation of where a group of people form
a corporation to limit their liability. That's why we have corporations.
Is there any suggestion in what you say that the Smith family is personally liable?
Nothing special's going on. It's ordinary.
MS. SCHIFFER [Counsel for the United States]: Any facility can have more than
one operator, Your Honor, and it is our view that if Mr. and Mrs. Smith themselves per-
sonally operated the facility, that is, actively participated in the management of the facility,
that they would be liable.
QUESTION: So your view is that if a group of people incorporate themselves and
they personally operate the dump, they are personally liable, so in this statute alone-
I've never seen another statute like that-there is no way for a group of operators to form
a corporation and thereby exempt themselves from personal liability.
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Justices regained their equilibrium, ironically, only when industry counsel
candidly acknowledged that the government's answer was not at all radical;
275
it merely reflected settled principles of environmental law established by
Congress through its legislative enactments and long sustained by the lower
courts. Those courts were responding to the fact that decisions affecting
environmental quality are often the product of decisions being made by
multiple actors. In the complex setting of contemporary corporate decision
making marked, as in Bestfoods, by parent, subsidiary, and successor corpora-
tions and overlapping corporate officers and boards of directors, notions of
individual responsibility are invariably undermined as is, therefore, the ability
of legal rules to deter undesirable conduct.
Of course, whether such a policy concern provides sufficient reason to
modify traditional limitations on corporate liability in the environmental con-
text is entirely up to Congress. And, for that same reason, whether Congress
has done so in CERCLA or in any other federal environmental law is simply a
matter of discerning congressional intent. In Bestfoods, however, there was
a marked imbalance to the Court's apprehension of the policy concerns
implicated by CERCLA. The Court was essentially unaware of the legiti-
mate policy reasons why Congress might have decided to expand corporate
liability in CERCLA, yet simultaneously quite aware of the policy justifica-
tions for limiting corporate liability. Not surprisingly, the Court's resulting
construction of CERCLA was inevitably skewed in favor of a construction
that promoted the latter. The Court required, in effect, those arguing for
I mean, is-that's the view of the Government? Because I would have thought that
if that's the view you would have expected Congress to say something about that rather
unusual-I think it would be unusual.
Official Transcript of the Oral Argument before the United States Supreme Court at 16-18,
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (No. 97-454), available in 1998 U.S. Trans. LEXIS
61. The identities of the Justices appearing in the brackets do not appear in the official transcripts.
They are based on my contemporaneous notes taken at the oral argument before the Court.
275. During industry counsel's oral argument, Justice Stevens returned to Justice Breyer's
earlier hypothetical posed to the government, apparently in an effort to emphasize to the other
Justices that the government's characterization of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980's (CERCLA's) impact on notions of limited corporate
liability was not in fact so extraordinary:
QUESTION [Justice Stevens]: Let me be sure I understand your position, Mr.
Geller. You take Justice Breyer's hypothetical and say yes, Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their
son would be liable, if I understand your-
MR. GELLER: If they were actually physically engaged in operating the facility,
they would fall within the statute, I would think, but that's not-
QUESTION: So that any employee of a corporation with a facility can be liable?
MR. GELLER: If someone satisfies the definition of operator, they're liable ....
Id. at 27.
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more expansive liability to overcome a judicially erected presumption favor-
ing limited liability.
276
2. Lawmaking Institutions and Processes
The evolutionary reach of environmental law is not, moreover, con-
fined to crosscutting areas of law. It extends to lawmaking institutions and
processes as well. Here, too, the problems environmental law seeks to address
pose peculiar challenges for those institutions and processes, creating the
need as well as the opportunities for innovation and reform.277
One can commence with an aspect of government as fundamental as
our system of checks and balances between branches of government. Such
a tripartite system of government is by deliberate design conservative, favor-
ing incremental change. Yet environmental problems often urge quick action
to avoid possible catastrophic and irreversible results. They also require a
degree of ongoing revision and fine-tuning in light of changing and uncertain
information that often resists the kind of sharp delineations between those
who legislate and those who merely execute the laws. It is for this reason that
long-moribund nondelegation issues have recently arisen in the environ-
mental context.
278
When, moreover, Congress seeks to create constitutional shortcuts in
order to control the other two branches of government, such legislative efforts
raise their own significant separation of powers concerns. This has occurred
in environmental law with congressional efforts to oversee the executive2 79
as well as the judicial branch.2a° It is no mere happenstance that a case as
infamous as Morrison v. Olson,"' concerning the constitutionality of the
276. See 524 U.S. at 70 ("There would in essence be a relaxed, CERCLA-specific rule of
derivative liability that would banish traditional standards and expectations from the law of
CERCLA liability. But, as we have said, such a rule does not arise from congressional silence, and
CERCLA's silence is dispositive.").
277. One innovation rejected early on by the Supreme Court was the D.C. Circuit's effort to
impose heightened procedural requirements in certain environmental cases. See Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 523-25 (1978).
278. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034-40, reh'g granted in part
and denied in part, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cit. 1999); South Dakota v. United States Dep't of the Inte-
rior, 69 F.3d 878, 881-82 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 519 U.S. 919 (1996); see also
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646-52 (1980); id. at 672-76
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
279. See Federal Land Policy & Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1), (d), (1)(2)
(1994) (providing for congressional committee oversight of secretary of the interior determinations
regarding the withdrawal of public lands from disposition laws); see also National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145, 1150-51 (D.D.C. 1983).
280. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 433-36 (1992).
281. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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independent counsel law, arose out of a conflict between the legislative and
executive branches regarding environmental policy. 8 2 Nor is it similarly
coincidental that the leading case pertaining to standards of judicial review
of agency statutory interpretation, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,283 involved
the EPA's changing its mind concerning the meaning of a federal environ-
mental protection law. 84 Such experimentation and policy reversals are the
natural byproduct of any good-faith efforts to address complex problems,
such as those presented by environmental pollution, when scientific uncer-
tainty is great and the relative differences in the costs of alternative approaches
are quite large.
Similar tensions arise because of the nation's commitment to multiple
sovereign authorities, including federal, state, and local governments and,
increasingly, tribal authorities as well. 25 There is at one level a natural
affinity between the resolution of environmental problems and a general bias
favoring decentralized legal regimes: It more easily allows for the resolution
of environmental problems to take localized circumstances, both ecological
and anthropological, into account.286 It is also more consistent with growing
demands for meaningful public participation, most recently by environ-
mental justice advocates. 287
Many environmental problems, however, strongly resist such decen-
tralized approaches. They do so largely because of their sweeping spatial and
282. The independent counsel investigation at issue in Morrison arose out of congressional
efforts to oversee the EPA's administration of federal hazardous-waste policy, especially in the area
of enforcement. See id. at 665-66.
283. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
284. The validity of the regulation at issue in Chevron turned on the EPA's construction of
the term "source" in the Clean Air Act, which the EPA had previously construed differently. See
id. at 853-59.
285. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570
(1996); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54
MD. L. REV. 1141, 1157-71 (1995); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethink-
ing the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210
(1992); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Imple-
mentation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
286. See Esty, supra note 285, at 609-10, 648-49; Richard J. Lazarus, Debunking Environmental
Feudalism: Promoting the Individual Through the Collective Pursuit of Environmental Quality, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 1739, 1773 (1992); David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It's Time for a New Look to Our
"Laboratories of Democracy" in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB.
L. REV. 347, 355-59 (1994); Stewart, supra note 285, at 1219-22.
287. See Gauna, supra note 268, at 72 (describing the inherent "mismatch" between
environmental law and policymaking processes and environmental justice because the latter's
"[d]ecision-making paradigms rest on foundations that promote environmental injustice");
Anne K. No, Note, Environmental Justice: Concentration on Education and Public Participation as an
Alternative Solution to Legislation, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 373, 389-92, 399-400
(1996) (advocating addressing environmental justice concerns through broader public participa-
tory rights in environmental decision making).
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temporal scope.2" Problems of such magnitude and scope defy localized juris-
dictional boundaries and shorter-term time horizons, and their resolution
may offer economies of scale that favor more centralized approaches.289 The
temporal and spatial spillovers are related in part to the physical character
of environmental problems. Ecosystems neither mirror political jurisdictional
boundaries nor reveal their injuries within time frames roughly commensurate
to those necessary for voters to hold decision makers accountable in election
year cycles.
Because, moreover, even small decision-making errors can pose threats
of irreversible, catastrophic ecological harm occurring beyond the decision
maker's own jurisdictional boundaries, the decentralization of certain kinds of
environmental decision making can be especially problematic. At the very
least, the essential Brandeisian observation that 'lilt is one of the happy inci-
dents of the federal system that a single courageous State may ... try novel
social and economic experiments"2" is deprived of some of its persuasive force
when, as happens with environmental injuries, errors made in those labora-
tories can have major adverse consequences that are not confineable to the
lab itself.
The spillover feature of environmental law is not, however, traceable
just to the physical character of many ecological injuries. The inevitability of
spillovers is further related to the nationwide scope of the market transactions
and industrial practices that are the subject of environmental regulations."'
Indeed, it is the national character of the affected markets and industries,
rather than the physical nature of the ecological injuries, that has prompted
the Supreme Court repeatedly to invalidate as undue burdens on interstate
commerce state and local governmental efforts to craft localized solutions to
environmental problems.92
288. The "spillover" or "externality" feature of ecological injuries is, of course, not the only
policy basis for favoring centralization of environmental lawmaking authority. There are a host of
arguments for and against either centralizing or decentralizing environmental lawmaking authority,
ranging from institutional competence to regulatory capture. This Article focuses only on a few, like
the spillover feature, that are especially illustrative of the relationship between the nature of
ecological injury to crosscutting legal issues arising in environmental law. For a fuller discussion
of the broader centralization/decentralization debate, see generally Esty, supra note 285, Rena I.
Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New (New) Federalism": Devolution,
Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97 (1996), and Stewart, supra note 285.
289. See Esty, supra note 285, at 614-17.
290. State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
291. See Gerald E. Frug, Why Neutrality?, 92 YALE L.J. 1591, 1600 (1983) ("There can be no
meaningfully decentralized decision making about environmental matters as long as decisions about
capital mobility are centralized.").
292. See, e.g., C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389-95 (1994);
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98-108 (1994); Chemical
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A final aspect of ecological injuries that affects lawmaking insti-
tutions and processes is the schizophrenic nature of government's role
in environmental protection.293 Government, whether it be federal, state,
local, or tribal, is the primary regulatory authority responsible for the
enactment, administration, and enforcement of environmental protection
laws. This is especially so because many of the nongovernmental interests
being protected by those laws are unable to bring enforcement actions on
their own behalf because of the nature of the injuries being addressed. To
the extent that future generations are being safeguarded, they are not yet
born and therefore obviously cannot sue; to the extent that purely
ecological interests are being preserved, those interests have no independ-
ent standing to sue;294 and to the extent that each member of the public
shares an undifferentiated, generalized, interest, current Supreme Court prece-
dent calls into question their standing to maintain an enforcement action.29
While government enforcement is essential, all of these sovereign
authorities are simultaneously undertaking actions that may violate each
others' environmental laws, and even their own. This raises a host of sov-
ereign immunity issues in response to enforcement actions brought against
the government. These suits may be brought by one sovereign against
another and sometimes by private citizens pursuant to citizen suit provi-
sions.296 They may sometimes even be brought by one agency against
another agency within the same sovereign, although the justiciability of such
a lawsuit for the federal sovereign is disputed. 97
Finally, disputes over natural resource ownership have historically
involved tribes as well as federal, state and local authorities,29 while envi-
Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 339-49 (1992); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
293. See Lazarus, supra note 211, at 2440 ("The single greatest source of institutional differ-
entiation in environmental law is the government's schizophrenic role as both regulator and regu-
lated, simultaneously enforcing environmental protection laws both against others and against itself
as the single largest source of pollution.").
294. Cf. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 456-57 (1972).
295. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992).
296. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 330 (1994);
United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 612-14 (1992); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7-13 (1989); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 198-99 (1976); Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93-98 (1972).
297. See Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government
Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 933-38 (1991); Michael W. Steinberg, Can EPA Sue
Other Federal Agencies?, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 317, 331-41 (1990).
298. See, e.g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 658-60 (1979); Chemehuevi
Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power Comm'n, 420 U.S. 395, 397-99 (1975); Department of Game v.
Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 45 (1973); United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians,
402 U.S. 159, 159 (1971).
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ronmental pollution cases have involved only the latter. In recent years,
however, the tribes have begun to assert their sovereignty in the pollution
control area as well.2 9
There are, accordingly, a series of deeply ingrained structural reasons
why the history of environmental law during the past three decades has wit-
nessed such continuous tension and conflict between federal, state, local, and
tribal authorities regarding their respective responsibilities and authorities
in addressing environmental problems. So many fundamental structural
lawmaking issues have arisen and continue to arise because of the types of
pressures generated by the nature of the problem being addressed. There is,
at bottom, a fundamental discontinuity between environmental law's aims
and our nation's lawmaking regime.)°
C. Persuading the Justices
The most obvious pathway to securing a change in attitude towards envi-
ronmental law in the Supreme Court is also the most problematic: Change
the identity of the Justices. Not only are such windows of opportunity
highly unpredictable in their occurrence," ' but they are also deliberately
shortlived in order to minimize the effectiveness of any such discrete efforts
to affect the nomination process.0 2
299. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 333-40 (1998); Back-
country Against Dumps v. EPA, 100 F.3d 147, 148-50 (D.C. Cir. 1996); City of Albuquerque v.
Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 418-20 (10th Cir. 1996).
300. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 233, at 1.
The promotion of environmental protection is further complicated because environmental
law is, to a greater extent than other areas of law, a product of external forces, difficult to
integrate into our legal system and limited to the extent that it seeks to impose rather than
to reflect fundamental societal values.
Id.
301. What is unpredictable is the precise timing of an opening. Over longer time frames, one
can fairly predict a certain number of openings, based simply on the age of the Justices. During
much of the 1980s, for instance, it was quite clear that the aging of the Justices made a series of
openings very likely during the 1990s. And, since Justice Brennan's retirement in 1990, four new
Justices (Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer) have been added to the Court.
302. President Bush, for instance, strived to choose his nominees quickly, which limited
opportunities to influence his decision. See, e.g., Ann Devroy, In the End, Souter Fit Politically,
WASH. POST, July 25, 1990, at Al; Al Kamen & Ruth Marcus, Marshall Retires from Divided
Supreme Court: Liberal Is Second to Quit in a Year; Bush to Move Quickly on Successor, WASH.
POST, June 28, 1991, at Al. President Clinton, by contrast, appears to have preferred to allow
certain names of possible nominees to be floated publicly for many days so that he could better
account for the political repercussions of choosing one candidate rather than another. Just such
an approach reportedly led Clinton to fuel speculation about Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt,
New York Governor Mario Cuomo, and then-Judge Stephen Breyer before finally selecting then-
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg as his first nominee to the Court. See MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS
CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATIONS 169-71 (1994).
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There is also a relevant lesson here to be learned from the paradoxical
voting patterns in environmental cases described above for most of the Jus-
tices, ranging from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Justice Stevens."3 They sug-
gest that it will be the rare candidate that will have a clear environmental
track record from which one can readily predict future votes as a Justice in
environmental cases. Certainly nothing much can be fairly gleaned from the
mere fact that the candidate, as a lower court judge or otherwise as a lawmaker
or policymaker, seemed to rule or vote "for" or "against" the environment in
a particular case or even several cases. In almost all instances, save a Justice
Douglas or a Justice Scalia, there will be too few cases and too much
disharmony to suggest any easily discernible pattern from which conclusions
about environmental protection can reasonably or fairly be drawn.
Notwithstanding these significant threshold limitations, the Court's
past three decades of precedent suggest that there are some background
traits from which one might plausibly speculate that an individual would be
more rather than less supportive of laws promoting environmental protec-
tion ends. These include (1) the individual's vision of the role of law
in general, and of lawmaking institutions in particular, in relation to the
nation's market economy, and (2) the individual's own life experiences in
relation to the natural environment.
Of the two, the former would seem the most intuitive. Those who gen-
erally favor law's serving as an instrument for social change should be more
sympathetic to facilitating the development of a legal regime for envi-
ronmental protection. Those, by contrast, who start with the premise that the
law's essential function should be to define and protect pre-existing property
rights and to promote market transactions would naturally be skeptical, if
not hostile, in their reception to environmental law. Justice Douglas would
seem to fit the former description, while Justice Scalia plainly fits the latter."l
It is the trait relating to an individual's personal and professional expe-
riences with the natural environment, however, that emerges most strikingly
from the votes of the individual Justices during the past three decades. It is
plainly no coincidence that the Justice with an EP score of 100, Justice
Douglas, was an avid outdoorsman. As described by Douglas himself, "I am
filled with prejudices, for I love the call of the homed owl in the darkness of
night, the howl of the coyote, the call of the mourning dove, and the whistle
of the bull elk."305 His personal experiences with the natural environment
303. See supra Part I.
304. See supra notes 127-134 and accompanying text.
305. Peter Manus, Wild Bill Douglas's Last Stand: A Retrospective on the First Supreme Court
Environmentalist, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 111,140 (1999) (quoting William 0. Douglas, The Conservation
of Man 7 (unpublished, undated essay, on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division)).
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made him value more highly governmental efforts designed to protect envi-
ronmental amenities. They also apparently made him far more willing
to accommodate other competing values, reflected in legal principles and
doctrines intersecting those advanced by environmental protection laws.
His near-unanimous support of environmental ends profoundly influenced
both his initial framing of the issues presented and ultimately his votes on
those issues.
But the lesson regarding the significance of personal experience for
environmental law is not one taught just by the historically rare case of Justice
Douglas. The crack in Justice Kennedy's votes generally favoring property
rights over environmental protection seems directly traceable to his own expe-
riences as a resident of California, where residents learn of the pitfalls of
developing land not physically suited for residential use.3" So too, both
Justice Powell's general antagonism towards pollution control laws and his
contrasting sympathy towards forest protection and historic preservation
would seem to derive from his personal experiences."7 His natural skepti-
cism of the efficacy of pollution control laws most likely stemmed from his
personal experiences as legal counsel for regulated industry in a private law
firm.0 s By contrast, one can plausibly speculate that his receptivity to historic
preservation law and national forest conservation probably stems from his
strong personal and professional affiliations with Colonial Williamsburg"
and his lifelong enjoyment of small-game hunting in forests. 1
306. See Lazarus, supra note 261, at 1423.
As a Californian, Justice Kennedy's insight into the desirability of environmental regula-
tion may stem from personal experience.... Californians have more reason to be aware
of the hidden perils in land which, to the untrained eye, might seem appropriate for
unrestricted development. In California, the repeated losses of life and destruction of
property caused by earthquakes, mudslides, floods, and fires serve as effective teachers.
Id.
307. Environmental law appears not to have been the only area of law in which Justice
Powell's votes were profoundly influenced by his perceptions of his own life experiences, including
his misperceptions of those experiences. Another, now infamous, example in civil rights law is Jus-
tice Powell's supplying of the crucial fifth vote to the majority ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 187 (1986), which upheld a state criminal conviction for homosexual sodomy. See id. at
189. Several years after that decision, Powell publicly acknowledged that he regretted his vote
in Bowers. See Linda Greenhouse, When Second Thoughts in Case Come Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
5, 1990, at A14. There is reasonable basis for speculation, moreover, that Justice Powell's original
vote in Bowers resulted in part from his erroneous belief that he did not know any homosexuals,
when, in fact, his own recent law clerks had included some. See JEFFRIES, supra note 137, at 521-
22; LAZARUS, supra note 35, at 386.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 137-139.
309. As previously described, the special solicitude to national forests that Justice Powell
displayed in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 719 (1978), may well have been the prod-
uct of such a personal experience. See supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 167-168.
HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 765 1999-2000
The votes of Justices Douglas, Kennedy, and Powell in environmental
cases all lend support to a common thesis: The extent to which a person,
including a Supreme Court Justice, cares about environmental protection
seems especially susceptible to being defined by their own personal experi-
ences with the natural environment. A Justice's affinity for the natural
environment, in turn, influences his or her conceptualization of the legal
issues presented in an environmental protection setting. For many, more-
over, an appreciation of environmental law's objectives and the legitimacy
and strength of the evolutionary demands that they place on competing legal
doctrines and on lawmaking institutions originates in personal experience.
It is apparently unlikely to be the exclusive product of abstract, dispas-
sionate thinking wholly removed from the natural environment that serves
as environmental law's core inspiration."
Of course, environmental law is hardly unique in this regard. Much of
the Court's civil rights precedent, based on the votes of the individual Jus-
tices in those cases, can be similarly explained. It is no happenstance, for
instance, that Justice O'Connor's conservative tendencies are greatly tem-
pered when the issues before the Court relate to issues of gender discrimina-
tion with which she can identify based on her own personal and professional
experiences.312 The voting patterns in civil rights cases of both Justice
Thurgood Marshall and Justice Thomas can be similarly explained. Their
views clearly have little in common, but their respective votes nonetheless
reflect the lessons each believes he learned not simply as a law student
studying the law or as a practicing lawyer, but as an African American
living with racism in the United States. It is precisely because many Afri-
can Americans believe that Justice Thomas is not being true to those life
experiences that some react with even more hostility to his votes than to
those of his conservative colleagues on the Court."'
Nor is there anything untoward or improper or even necessarily inten-
tional about such factors' influencing judicial outcomes. It is both unavoidable
and entirely appropriate for judges, including Supreme Court Justices, to
be influenced by their own life experiences in exercising their judgment in
311. For this reason, the environmental community has long found reason for hope in
Justice Souter's apparent strong interest in hiking in the White Mountains of New Hampshire.
See Fox Butterfield, Unchanged, but Growing as Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1992, at A16; David
Margolick, Ascetic at Home but Vigorous on Bench, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1990, at Al.
312. See Linda Greenhouse, From the High Court, a Voice Quite Distinctly a Woman's, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 1999, at Al.
313. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas in Retrospect, 45 HASTINGS L.J.
1405, 1418 (1994).
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the cases before them."4 Life experiences shape the way a person, both con-
sciously and unconsciously, perceives issues presented. They construct
frames of reference within which those issues are inevitably placed and that,
as a result, affect their resolution."315 Competing frames of reference can explain
why different decision makers perceive the same legal dispute as implicating
very different concerns. There are, moreover, some areas of law, such as
environmental law and civil rights law, for which life experiences and
related frames of reference appear likely to be more influential. Hence, strong
positive or negative life experiences with respect to natural resources can
create analogous frames of reference that can result in judges' (and Justices')
organizing the facts and legal issues of a case in their minds in a way that
highlights the environmental dimension."'
What, therefore, are the possible lessons for the future of environ-
mental law in the Supreme Court? They could be to secure, in the first
instance, the appointment of Justices on the Supreme Court whose personal
and professional life experiences include those that have allowed for a fuller
appreciation of the importance and difficulty of the problems environ-
mental law seeks to address."' They might also be to promote such oppor-
tunities for current members of the Court.
314. A striking recent example for Justice O'Connor is her joining with the more liberal
members of the Court to author the majority opinion in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educa-
tion, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999), to hold school districts potentially liable under federal civil rights law
for sexual harassment of students by other students, notwithstanding O'Connor's normal wariness of
federal intrusions on local schools. See id. at 1669-76. In announcing the Court's opinion from the
bench, "Justice O'Connor concluded her announcement of the decision by addressing the
dissenters who, she said, maintained that the ruling would 'teach little Johnny a perverse lesson in
Federalism.' Rather, she said, the majority believed the decision 'assures that little Mary may
attend class."' Linda Greenhouse, Sex Harassment in Class Is Ruled Schools' Liability, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 1999, at Al.
315. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981) ("The frame that a decisionmaker adopts is controlled partly by
the formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the
decisionmaker .... [C]hanges of perspective often reverse the relative apparent size of objects and
the relative desirability of options.").
316. I owe a special debt here to Professor Chris Schroeder, whose comments on an earlier
draft aided me considerably in how to think about this aspect of judicial decision making.
317. The apparent democratization of the process of nominating and confirming Justices to
the Supreme Court has made such considerations a topic for public scrutiny in nominees. See
SILVERSTEIN, supra note 302, at 160-65. The concerns of environmentalists were among the litany
of those raised during Judge Bork's Senate confirmation hearings. See id. at 72.
During the course of the Bork proceedings, for example, the general counsel of
the Audubon Society was moved to write the members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee and illustrate how Bork's interpretation of the rules of standing and
justiciability might seriously constrict the ability of citizen groups to challenge in federal
court "the weakening of national surface mining regulations" or to require the gov-
ernment "to issue regulations protecting visibility in our national parks to protect some
767
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The latter possibility may seem scandalously improper. And undoubt-
edly any "fact-finding trips" would be, were they designed to influence the
Justices' perception of the facts in identifiable cases pending (or soon to be)
before the Court. But it seems much less obviously so were the outdoor edu-
cational trips planned in conjunction with judicial conferences and more
generally aimed at educating judges (including Justices) about the stakes
in environmental controversies."" As outrageously unconventional as such a
proposal may sound for the promotion of law reform in the Supreme Court,
it might nonetheless well be the single most effective means for changing
perceptions and attitudes on the Court.
Short of promoting such extracurricular judicial activities, restoration
of what is environmental about environmental law will most certainly
require more effective advocacy before the Court. Any such advocacy will
need to be presented through the legal issues and facts of the individual
cases brought to the Court's attention. Each of those cases presents the Jus-
tices with a story about the way in which laws affect the quality of life and an
opportunity to try to tap into the Justices' own backgrounds in the telling
unique and threatened resources like Mono Lake, the Alaska Coastal Plain or whooping
cranes in Central Nebraska."
Id.
Perhaps ironically, however, Judge Bork's subsequent writings strongly suggest that he would
have been a strong ally of the environmental community in at least one area-the so-called regu-
latory takings issue-that is a core legal issue that divides environmental regulators and property
rights advocates. See supra notes 255-263 and accompanying text. Judge Bork has specifically
denounced the more extreme construction of the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause
advanced by property rights advocates as "not plausibly related to the original understanding of
the takings clause." See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 230 (1990). To the extent, however, that modem environmental law
has been dependent on a vision of an activist government regulating private activity, one would
be hard pressed to contend that the environmental community's concerns about Judge Bork were
wholly misplaced. But, in all events, what hindsight certainly reveals is that the environmental
community was correct that their concerns were substantially implicated by the opening for which
Bork was nominated, because Justice Kennedy succeeded to that position on the Court and is
today the most telling vote in environmental cases. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying
text. On the other hand, one can question the long-term wisdom of the environmental commu-
nity's opposition to President Clinton's possible selection of Secretary of the Interior Bruce
Babbitt as his first nominee to the Supreme Court, based on conservationists' concern with losing
him at Interior. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 302, at 170; Thomas L. Friedman, The 1 Ith-Hour
Scramble: After Hoping for a 'Home Run' in Choosing a Justice, Clinton May Be Just Home Free, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 1993, at Al.
318. Legislative and executive branch officials, who admittedly have very different policy-
making responsibilities and ethical obligations from those of judges, routinely participate in both
case-specific and generic fact-finding trips. Although many of these trips are unlikely models for
representative democracy, bordering on vacation boondoggles improperly proffered in hope of cur-
rying the officials' future favor, there seems to be little question that a fact-finding trip may legiti-
mately provide decision makers with enhanced appreciation of what is at stake in their decision
making and, for that reason, promote sounder decisions.
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of that story. The cumulative effect of multiple stories, moreover, can over
time significantly affect the way Justices decide what cases to hear and how
then to decide the legal issues presented.
The property rights movement has used this technique with enormous
success, but to the detriment of environmental protection concerns.319 By
bringing to the Justices' attention during the past several decades a series
of cases the factual allegations of which appear to support property rights
advocates' claims of environmental regulatory overreaching-claims of eco-
nomic wipeouts,"' wheelchair-bound, blind widows being denied the right
to build a dream home,32 ' and city planning boards repeatedly breaking prom-
ises to developers in a misguided effort to curtail development to protect a
butterfly that has not been seen on the land for over a decade32-these
advocates have successfully fostered a general judicial skepticism about the
reasonableness of environmental laws.
The Justices have responded to these stories by repeatedly granting
review in cases in the absence of circuit conflict or any other of the indicia
traditionally necessary for Supreme Court review."' And, even when itbecomes apparent upon closer review that the actual inequities are much
319. Ironically, it is also the members of the property rights movement, not environmental-
ists, who have recently been accused of literally taking judges on hikes in order to persuade them
to be more skeptical of environmental protection laws. Their alleged vehicles for influencing the
members of the federal judiciary are legal education programs held for judges in recreational
resorts in the Far West. See Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical
Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 511 (1998).
[Tihe most activist judges on the Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims-
the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over most takings cases against the federal
government-all recently have attended the same, all-expenses-paid, week-long summer
seminar at a Montana resort hosted by a property rights group. Finally, we found that
the same conservative foundations that funded these Montana seminars also bankroll
takings litigation before the Federal Circuit.
Id.
320. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-32 (1992).
321. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 729-33 (1997); Richard J.
Lazarus, Litigating Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in the United States Supreme Court,
12 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 179, 184-86 (1997).
322. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1631
(1999) ("The butterfly lives for one week, travels a maximum of 200 feet, and must land on a
mature, flowering buckwheat plant to survive. Searches for the butterfly from 1981 through 1985
yielded but a single larva, discovered in 1984."). It should be noted that the City of Monterey case,
unlike the previous regulatory takings cases, was actually brought to the Supreme Court by the
city of Monterey and not by the land developer. The city filed the petition for a writ of certiorari
in the case, which the Court then granted. See id. at 1635. The Court's opinion on the merits,
adverse to the city in many significant respects, exhibits a palatable hostility to the city based on the
Court's perception of the inequitable manner in which the city handled the developer's request for
permission to develop. The case thereby underscores the pitfalls of unwittingly presenting the
Court with "bad facts" for one's own legal position.
323. See Lazarus, supra note 261, at 1415-16.
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smaller than they first appeared, those Justices have strived nonetheless to
maintain a majority in favor of the property owner, albeit with a less sweeping
ruling than that sought by property rights advocates. The Justices' skepticism
towards environmental protection laws and their general view that this is an
area of regulatory law that warrants some constitutional curbing has remained
intact.
It is, of course, that same judicial skepticism that environmentalists
and environmental regulators must now overcome. It will require a concerted
effort through case management and case selection to bring to the Justices'
attention cases that instruct the Court on the important policies and values
safeguarded by environmental protection and natural resource conservation
laws. Doing so will, at a minimum, require the discipline necessary to avoid
self-inflicted wounds caused by environmentalists and environmental regula-
tors who insist on trying to obtain the Court's review to hear "their case,"
notwithstanding the poor factual setting within which what might otherwise
be a sound legal argument is presented.24 Only a persistent, strategic effort
can overcome the contrary message successfully communicated to the Justices
during the past two decades.
A possible role model is the State and Local Legal Center, which has
served an analogous function for state and local governments for more than
fifteen years. The center, which is supported by a host of state and local
governmental organizations,325 was created in response to the widespread con-
cern expressed, including by members of the Court, regarding the relatively
poor quality of advocacy before the Court on behalf of the interests of state
and local government."
The center, accordingly, assists state and local attorneys in their prepa-
ration of briefs and oral arguments before the Court. But, perhaps even more
importantly, the center systematically files amicus briefs before the Court in
324. Such a self-inflicted wound appears to have been precisely what occurred in the recent
City of Monterey litigation before the Court. See supra note 322. Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy's
factual statement in his majority opinion for the Court in that case strongly suggests that the liti-
gation has created even more distance between the environmental movement and the single most
important Justice for environmental law before the Court. A far greater self-inflicted wound,
however, may have been the opposition that environmentalists directed (apparently successfully)
against President Clinton's nominating Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt to the Supreme
Court-the president's reported first choice-because they did not want to lose him at Interior's
helm. See supra note 317.
325. Supporting organizations include, for example, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the
National League of Cities, the Council of State Governments, the National Association of Coun-
ties, the International Municipal Lawyers Association, the National Conference of State Legisla-
tures, and the National Governors' Association.
326. See Helping Hand, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 17, 1983, at 6; Lawrence R. Velvel, "Better
Mousetrap" Could Convince High Court, LEGAL TIMES, May 30, 1983, at 10.
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cases raising important legal issues implicating the interests of state and local
governments. The briefs are filed by center attorneys who specialize in
Supreme Court advocacy and by outside counsel who are experienced
Supreme Court practitioners and willing to assist the center on a pro bono
basis. The briefs filed express a consistent, coherent, and scholarly vision of
the federal-state relationship. They typically take a longer-term, more strate-
gic view regarding how best to influence the Court's decision making, which
almost always depends on a series of incremental steps rather than on one
paradigm-busting moment. The result has been a most effective presentation
to the Court, which has borne much judicial fruit.327 That is precisely the
kind of effort needed on behalf of environmental protection that has been
missing before the Court."'
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's attitude towards environmental law during the
past three decades has generally been marked by apathy, but with the Justices
exhibiting increasing signs of skepticism and some hostility. At best, many of
the Justices do not view environmental law as a distinct area of law, but as
merely a factual context for the raising of more important crosscutting legal
issues. At worst, some of the Justices appear to see the kind of legal regime
environmental law promotes as precisely the kind of centralized, intrusive
327. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida Pre-
paid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
328. The Court's ruling this January in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., No. 98-822, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 501 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2000), just as this Article went to
final press, underscores the advantages of such strategic advocacy. After considerable consultation
and debate within the environmental public interest community, the environmental organizations
who had lost on standing grounds in both Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) and Public Interest Research Group v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cit.
1997) agreed not to petition for certiorari, because of concerns that the facts of those cases did not
present those organizations' legal arguments in sufficiently sympathetic factual settings for
Supreme Court review. Similar debate preceded the decision to seek certiorari in Friends of the
Earth, which had the advantage of both very favorable facts (e.g., trial court findings of hundreds
of exceedances of limitations on mercury discharges) and a seasoned Supreme Court advocate (Bruce
Terris) representing the environmental petitioner. Counsel for the petitioners consulted with
members of the environmental public interest law bar, legal academics, and experienced Supreme
Court advocates in preparing the certiorari petition, merits briefs, and oral argument. The amicus
briefs were also carefully coordinated and included at least one brief that directly challenged those
recent opinions authored by Justice Scalia for the Court that were of greatest concern to
environmental citizen suit plaintiffs. See Amicus Brief of Americans for the Environment at 3-10,
Friends of the Earth (No. 98-822). The litigation strategy included simultaneous efforts to tell the
story of citizen suits to the news media in order to further enhance the prospects of success before
the Court, which resulted in a front page story in the New York Times. See William Glaberson,
Novel Antipollution Tool Is Being Upset by Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1999, at Al.
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system of laws that they believe to be both constitutionally suspect and
unwise as a matter of social policy.
It will not be easy to change the views of the current Justices or to secure
the future appointment of Justices who feel different about environmental
law. Like environmental law itself, the undertaking will be long-term and
inevitably marked by short-term missteps. It will require a persistent, case-by-
case effort to present environmental law's story to the Justices in factual
settings that bolster rather than undermine the importance of environ-
mental protection. The purpose of such advocacy should be for the Justices
to gain a broader understanding of the particular challenges presented by
the establishment of a legal regime for environmental protection and then
to be willing to meet those challenges. Only then can the puzzling role that
the Court has played in environmental law during the past three decades
come to an end and the Justices' current skepticism be replaced by their
active and constructive engagement.
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APPENDIX A
Environmental Cases Decided by the United States Supreme Court
October Term 1969-October Term 1998
Cite Name Year
Decided
397 U.S. 88 Arkansas v. Tennessee 1970
397 U.S. 620 Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma 1970
400 U.S. 48 Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp. 1970
401 U.S. 402 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. 1971
Volpe
401 U.S. 493 Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. 1971
401 U.S. 520 United States v. District Court 1971
401 U.S. 527 United States v. District Court in and for Water 1971Division No. 5
402 U.S. 159 United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of 1971Indians
402 U.S. 558 United States v. International Minerals & 1971
Chemical Corp.
403 U.S. 9 Utah v. United States 1971
405 U.S. 727 Sierra Club v. Morton 1972
406 U.S. 91 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee 1972
406 U.S. 109 Washington v. General Motors Corp. 1972
406 U.S. 117 Nebraska v. Iowa 1972
409 U.S. 80 United States v. Jim 1972
409 U.S.47 Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. 1973
U.S. 470 United States
410 U.S. 73 EPA v. Mink 1973
410 U.S. 641 Ohio v. Kentucky 1973
410 U.S. 719 Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water 1973Storage District
410 U.S. 743 Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec 1973Watershed Improvement District
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Cite Name Year
Decided
411 U.S. 325 Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc. 1973
411 U.S. 624 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. 1973
411 U.S. 655 United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial 1973
Chemical Corp.
412 U.S. 481 Mattz v. Arnett 1973
412 U.S. 541 Fri v. SierraClub 1973
412 U.S. 580 United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co. 1973
412 U.S. 669 United States v. Students Challenging 1973
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP)
414 U.S. 44 Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe 1973
414 U.S. 313 Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona 1973
415 U.S. 289 Mississippi v. Arkansas 1974
416 U.S. 1 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas 1974
416 U.S. 861 Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa 1974
Corp.
420 U.S. 35 Train v. City of New York 1975
420 U.S. 136 Train v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc. 1975
420 U.S. 194 Antoine v. Washington 1975
420 U.S. 304 Utah v. United States 1975
420 U.S. 395 Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power 1975
Commission
420 U.S. 515 United States v. Maine 1975
420 U.S. 529 United States v. Louisiana 1975
420 U.S. 531 United States v. Florida 1975
421 U.S. 60 Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1975Inc.
421 U.S. 240 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness 1975
Society
422 U.S. 13 United States v. Louisiana 1975
422 U.S. 184 United States v. Alaska 1975
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Cite Name Year
Decided
Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Co. v. Students
422 U.S. 289 Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 1975
(SCRAP)
424 U.S. 295 Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona 1976
425 U.S. 649 Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast 1976
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research426 U.S. 1 Grun1976roup, Inc.
426 U.S. 128 Cappaert v. United States 1976
426 U.S. 167 Hancock v. Train 1976
426 U.S. 200 EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources 1976
Control Board
426 U.S. 363 New Hampshire v. Maine 1976
426 U.S. 465 Texas v. Louisiana 1976
426 U.S. 529 Kleppe v. New Mexico 1976
426 U.S. 776 Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers 1976
Ass'n
427 U.S. 246 Union Electric Co. v. EPA 1976
427 U.S. 390 Kleppe v. Sierra Club 1976
429 U.S. 363 Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis 1977
Sand & Gravel Co.
430 U.S. 112 E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train 1977
431 U.S. 99 EPA v. Brown 1977
431 U.S. 265 Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc. 1977
434 U.S. 275 Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States 1978
435 U.S. 151 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 1978
435 U.S. 519 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 1978
National Resources Defense Council, Inc.
436 U.S. 371 Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission 1978
436 U.S. 604 Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co. 1978
437 U.S. 153 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 1978
437 U.S. 617 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey 1978
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Cite Name Year
Decided
438 U.S. 59 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental 1978Study Group, Inc.
438 U.S. 104 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 1978
City
438 U.S. 645 California v. United States 1978
438 U.S. 696 United States v. New Mexico 1978
440 U.S. 391 Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 1979
Planning Agency
440 U.S. 668 Leo Sheep Co. v. United States 1979
441 U.S. 322 Hughes v. Oklahoma 1979
442 U.S. 347 Andrus v. Sierra Club 1979
442 U.S. 653 Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 1979
443 U.S. 658 Washington v. Washington State Commercial 1979
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n
444 U.S. 51 Andrus v. Allard 1979
444 U.S. 164 Kaiser Aetna v. United States 1979
444 U.S. 206 Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp. 1979
444 U.S.223 Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. 1980
Karlen
444 U.S. 335 Ohio v. Kentucky 1980
445 U.S. 193 Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle 1980
445 U.S. 198 Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation 1980
445 U.S. 253 United States v. Clarke 1980
445 U.S. 535 United States v. Mitchell 1980
445 U.S. 715 Andrus v. Idaho 1980
446 U.S. 253 United States v. Louisiana 1980
446 U.S. 500 Andrus v. Utah 1980
446 U.S. 578 Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc. 1980
446 U.S. 657 Andrus v. Shell Oil Co. 1980
447 U.S. 1 United States v. California 1980
447 U.S. 125 California v. Nevada 1980
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Cite Name Year
Decided
447 U.S. 255 Agins v. City of Tiburon 1980
447 U.S. 352 Bryant v. Yellen 1980
448 U.S. 242 United States v. Ward 1980
448 U.S. 371 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians 1980
448 U.S. 607 Industrial Union Department v. American 1980
Petroleum Institute
449 U.S. 64 EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n 1980
449 U.S. 456 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. 1981
450 U.S. 544 Montana v. United States 1981
450 U.S. 621 San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San 1981Diego
451 U.S. 259 Watt v. Alaska 1981
451 U.S. 287 California v. Sierra Club 1981
452 U.S. 264 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 1981
Reclamation Ass'n
452 U.S. 314 Hodel v. Indiana 1981
453 U.S. 1 Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. 1981
U.S. 1 National Sea Clammers Ass'n
453 U.S. 490 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego 1981
453 U.S. 609 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana 1981
454 U.S. 139 Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace 1981
Education Project
454 U.S. 151 Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation 1981
454 U.S. 516 Texaco, Inc. v. Short 1982
456 U.S. 305 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo 1982
457 U.S. 55 Zobel v. Williams 1982
457 U.S. 273 California ex rel. State Lands Commission v. 1982
United States
458 U.S. 941 Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas 1982
459 U.S. 176 Colorado v. New Mexico 1982
460 U.S. 300 North Dakota v. United States 1983
460 U.S. 605 Arizona v. California 1983
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Cite Name Year
Decided
460 U.S. 766 Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against 1983
Nuclear Energy
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy
461 U.S. 190 Resources Conservation & Development 1983
Commission
461 U.S. 273 Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of 1983University & School Lands
462 U.S. 36 Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc. 1983
462 U.S. 87 Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural 1983
Resources Defense Council, Inc.
462 U.S. 554 Texas v. New Mexico 1983
462 U.S. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon 1983
1017
463 U.S. 110 Nevada v. United States 1983
463 U.S. 206 United States v. Mitchell 1983
463 U.S. 545 Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe 1983
464 U.S. 238 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 1984
464 U.S. 312 Secretary of the Interior v. California 1984
466 U.S. 96 Louisiana v. Mississippi 1984
466 U.S. 198 Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands 1984Commission
466 U.S. 765 Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band 1984
of Mission Indians
467 U.S. 1 Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States 1984
467 U.S. 229 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 1984
467 U.S. 310 Colorado v. New Mexico 1984
467 U.S. 837 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 1984
Defense Council, Inc.
467 U.S. 986 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 1984
469 U.S. 274 Ohio v. Kovacs 1985
469 U.S. 504 United States v. Maine 1985
470 U.S. 93 United States v. Louisiana 1985
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Cite Name Year
Decided
470 U.S. 116 Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural 1985
Resources Defense Council, Inc.
471 U.S. 84 United States v. Locke 1985
471 U.S. 759 Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians 1985
473 U.S.17 Williamson County Regional Planning 1985
3U.S. 172 Commission v. Hamilton Bank
473 U.S. 568 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products 1985Co.
473 U-S-75 Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife v. 19853U.S. 7 Klamath Indian Tribe
474 U.S. 121 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 1985
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey 1986474 U.S. 494 Department of Environmental Protection
475 U.S. 1 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities 1986Commission
475 U.S. 89 United States v. Maine 1986
475 U.S. 355 Exxon Corp. v. Hunt 1986
476 U.S. 227 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States 1986
476 U.S. 498 South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc. 1986
476 U.S. 834 United States v. Mottaz 1986
477 U.S. 131 Maine v. Taylor 1986
477 U.S. 207 Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire 1986
477 U.S. 340 MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of 1986Yolo
478 U.S. 221 Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean 1986Society
478 U.S. 546 Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' 1986
Council for Clean Air
478 U.S. 597 United States v. James 1986
479 U.S. 481 International Paper Co. v. Ouellette 1987
480 U.S. 370 Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action 1987
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Cite Name Year
Decided
480 U.S. 470 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 1987DeBenedictis
480 U.S. 531 Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell 1987
480 U.S. 572 California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock 1987
Co.
480 U.S. 700 United States v. Cherokee Nation 1987
481 U.S. 412 Tull v. United States 1987
481 U.S. 704 Hodel v. Irving 1987
482 U.S. 124 Texas v. New Mexico 1987
482 U.S. 193 Utah Division of State Lands v. United States 1987
482 U.S. 304 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 1987County of Los Angeles
483 U.S. 711 Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' 1987Council for Clean Air
483 U.S. 825 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 1987
484 U.S. 49 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay 1987
Foundation, Inc.
484 U.S. 469 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi 1988
484 U.S. 495 ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri 1988
485 U.S. 88 United States v. Louisiana 1988
485 U.S. 439 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 1988
Ass'n
490 U.S. 163 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico 1989
490 U.S. 332 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council 1989
490 U.S. 360 Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council 1989
491 U.S. 1 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 1989
491 U.S. 350 New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of 1989New Orleans
492 U.S. 408 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the 1989
Yakima Indian Nation
493 U.S. 20 Hallstrom v. Tillamook County 1989
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Cite Name Year
Decided
495 U.S. 490 California v. Federal Energy Regulatory 1990
Commission
496 U.S. 530 General Motors Corp. v. United States 1990
497 U.S. 871 Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation 1990
500 U.S. 380 Illinois v. Kentucky 1991
501 U.S. 221 Oklahoma v. New Mexico 1991
501 U.S. 597 Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier 1991
502 U.S. 437 Wyoming v. Oklahoma 1992
503 U.S. 91 Arkansas v. Oklahoma 1992
503 U.S. 429 Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society 1992
503 U.S. 519 Yee v. City of Escondido 1992
503 U.S. 569 United States v. Alaska 1992
503 U.S. 607 United States Department of Energy v. Ohio 1992
504 U.S. 334 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt 1992
504 Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan 1992
4U.S. 3 Department of Natural Resources
504 U.S. 555 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 1992
505 U.S. 88 Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management 1992
Ass'n
505 U.S. 144 New York v. United States 1992
505 U.S. 557 City of Burlington v. Dague 1992
505 U.S. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 1992
1003
506 U.S. 73 Mississippi v. Louisiana 1992
507 U.S. 584 Nebraska v. Wyoming 1993
508 U.S. 679 South Dakota v. Bourland 1993
511 U.S. 93 Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of 1994
Environmental Quality
511 U.S. 328 City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund 1994
511 U.S. 383 C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown 1994
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Cite Name Year
Decided
511 U.S. 700 PUD No. 1 v. Washington Department of 1994
Ecology
511 U.S. 809 Key Tronic Corp. v. United States 1994
512 U.S. 43 City of Ladue v. Gilleo 1994
512 U.S. 374 Dolan v. City of Tigard 1994
513 U.S. 527 Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge 1995
& Dock Co.
514 U.S. 673 Kansas v. Colorado 1995
515 U.S. 1 Nebraska v. Wyoming 1995
515 U.S. 687 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities 1995
for a Great Oregon
516 U.S. 22 Louisiana v. Mississippi 1995
516 U.S. 365 United States v. Maine 1996
516 U.S. 479 Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. 1996
519 U.S. 234 Babbitt v. Youpee 1997
519 U.S. 355 Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n 1997
520 U.S. 154 Bennett v. Spear 1997
520 U.S. 725 Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 1997
521 U.S. 1 United States v. Alaska 1997
521 U.S. 261 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe 1997
521 U.S. 507 City of Boerne v. Flores 1997
521 U.S. 591 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor 1997
522 U.S. 329 South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe 1998
522 U.S. 520 Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal 1998
Government
523 U.S. 83 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment 1998
523 U.S. 726 Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club 1998
523 U.S. 767 New Jersey v. New York 1998
524 U.S. 38 United States v. Beggerly 1998
524 U.S. 51 United States v. Bestfoods 1998
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Cite Name Year
Decided
119 S. Ct. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at 1999
1624 Monterey, Ltd.
119 S. Ct. Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Indian 19
1719 Tribe
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APPENDIX B
Environmental Cases Decided by the United States Supreme Court
October Term 1969-October Term 1998
By Justice-Number of Opinions Authored and Majority Opinions Joined
Justice Opinion Majority Dissent Percent in Majority
Author Majority Dissent
split
Black 0 6 2 75.00 percent 0
Blackmun 22 160 40 80.00 percent 1
Brennan 16 141 38 78.77 percent 2
Breyer 1 20 3 86.96 percent 0
Burger 8 140 13 91.50 percent 2
Douglas 12 20 11 64.52 percent 1
Ginsburg 2 29 3 90.63 percent 0
Harlan 1 6 1 85.71 percent 0
Kennedy 6 55 2 96.49 percent 1
Marshall 20 139 37 78.98 percent 3
O'Connor 21 109 17 86.51 percent 2
Powell 10 124 19 86.71 percent 2
Rehnquist 21 175 34 83.73 percent 5
Scalia 9 64 12 84.21 percent 1
Souter 7 42 7 85.71 percent 0
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Justice Opinion Majority Dissent Percent in Majority/
Author Maiority Dissent
____ ___ ___ 
___split
Stevens 21 142 44 76.34 percent 1
Stewart 7 86 15 85.15 percent 0
Thomas 4 39 6 86.67 percent 1
White 36 173 21 89.18 percent 2
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APPENDIX D
Environmental Cases Decided by the United States Supreme Court
October Term 1969-October Term 1998
By Justice-Environmental Protection Scores
Justice EP Ratio EP Score
(# EP votes/EP cases) (EP Ratio x 100)
Black 3/4 75
Blackmun 56/96 58.3
Brennan 48/82 58.5
Breyer 4/6 66.6
Burger 23/67 34.3
Douglas 15/15 100
Ginsburg 7/11 63.6
Harlan 1/3 33.3
Kennedy 7/27 25.9
Marshall 49/80 61.3
O'Connor 17/55 30.9
Powell 18/60 30
Rehnquist 35/96 36.5
Scalia 5/36 13.8
Souter 12/21 57.1
Stevens 43/85 50.6
Stewart 20/47 42.6
Thomas 4/20 20
White 33/91 36.3
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